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WHETHER THE BRIGHT-LINE CUT-OFF RULE AND THE 
ADVERSARIAL EXPERT EXPLANATION OF ADAPTIVE 
FUNCTIONING EXACERBATES CAPITAL JUROR 
COMPREHENSION OF THE INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 1 
Leona Deborah Jochnowitz 2; May 30, 2018 3 
“Whether Atkins reflects good legal reasoning or-as Justice Scalia 
called it in his dissent-‘nothing but the personal views of its 
members,’ it is poor psychiatric thinking for [these] reasons. First, 
Atkins implicitly assumes that persons with mental retardation 
comprise a discrete psychiatric category of individuals who are 
readily and naturally distinguishable from other persons, when, in 
fact, the opposite is the case: mental retardation is a classification 
defined by arbitrary statistical boundaries.”4  
 
1 This article is dedicated to the memory of the author’s advisor and mentor, Dr. William 
J. Bowers, who passed away in 2017. It is impossible to write about capital jury research 
without thinking deeply about his contributions and mentorship, and about how he has 
provided insight and might have continued to advise me on the findings here.  
2 Leona D. Jochnowitz, J.D./Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Criminal and Restorative 
Justice at Northern Vermont University, Johnson State College, where she teaches courses 
which include Restorative Justice, Wrongful Convictions, and the Death Penalty. Dr. 
Jochnowitz’s research involves the death penalty, capital juror decision making, mental 
health and intellectual disability defenses, the structural causes of wrongful convictions, and 
Vermont’s Restorative Justice programs. She focuses on the receptivity of capital jurors to 
mitigating factors of mental illness, intellectual disability, and addiction; mental health 
defenses by female defendants, defining intellectual disability, and extra-legal considerations 
such as race and gender. She is a member of the New York State and Federal Bars, and is the 
book review editor for the Criminal Law Bulletin. 
3 The author would like to thank Steven V. DeBraccio, Esq. for his excellent consultation 
in the editing of this article. The author is grateful to the many other colleagues and scholars, 
including Gary J. Kowaluk, J.D./Ph.D. and Liz Vartkessian, Ph.D. who reviewed and 
commented on the article. The author is also grateful to Dr. James R. Acker, J.D./Ph.D. for 
his advice and guidance. I am indebted to the editors and faculty advisors at Touro Law 
Review who graciously facilitated the publication of this article.  
4 Douglas Mossman, M.D., Atkins v. Virginia, A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. 
REV. 255, 256 (2003) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
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“[T]he cut-off of 70 represents a statistical convention more 
than a natural boundary between two groups of individuals.”5 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines a sample of Capital Jury Project (CJP 1) 
cases with available trial transcripts in which jurors were presented 
with mitigating intellectual disability evidence and may have been 
confused by issues of proof, definitions, and extralegal factors. It 
tests the hypothesis that jurors’ receptivity to mitigating intellectual 
disability (ID) was limited by their difficulties with the adversarial 
mental proof and clinical definitions needed to establish it. Further 
the juror decision-making may have been obscured by distractions 
from extralegal factors, unrelated to the evidence like premature 
decision-making and heuristic shortcuts, pro-death bias, and racial 
prejudice. It also examines whether the bright line cut-off rule, 
followed in some sample states prior to the Supreme Court decision 
in Hall v. Florida (2014), exacerbated jurors’ understanding of the 
disability, and encouraged popular stereotypes and misconceptions 
about intellectual disability. In Kentucky, a state with the bright line 
cut-off rule, at the time these cases were decided, jurors were 
confused about a range of IQ scores and intellectual declines during 
developmental years. “IQ was perhaps not above what we consider a 
moron? I think they were contending that he had an IQ of 70 or 76 or 
so, had been tested as high as the 80s I recall.” (CJP KY death case 
#531, juror #725). Even in non-bright line sample States like South 
Carolina, with no ID exemption at the time, jurors misunderstood the 
range of numerical IQ evidence. The study concludes that juror 
assessment of intellectual disability (ID) is variable. Some jurors 
view ID as a more “organic” sympathetic disorder than other mental 
disorders, and they seem to understand it in practical, lay terms. Yet, 
capital juror decision making is marred by extra-legal factors that 
impair consideration of the mitigating evidence. The study concludes 
that juror misunderstanding regarding mitigating evidence has 
stubbornly persisted throughout the history of the Capital Jury Project 
and arises from shortcomings in human cognition which impede 
jurors’ moral consideration of intellectual disability evidence. In light 
 
5 MICHAEL CHAFETZ, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORENSIC ISSUES 92 
(2015) (citing Mossman, supra note 4, at 256. Intelligence is measured by an intelligence 
quotient (or IQ) with the average being 100. 
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of these flaws, it may be impossible to avoid the unacceptable risk 
that persons with intellectual disability will be executed. This study 
suggests that mildly intellectually disabled persons were indeed 
executed because jurors misunderstood the ID evidence and were 
persuaded by extralegal racial biases and premature decision making. 
   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines a convenience sample of Capital Jury 
Project (CJP 1) cases with trial transcripts in which jurors were 
presented with mitigating intellectual disability evidence and may 
have been confused by issues of trial proof, clinical definitions, and 
extralegal factors. This is an exploratory study of capital juror 
receptivity to mitigating intellectual disability (ID) evidence in thirty-
eight death penalty trials, comparing the trial transcripts and 1990s 
CJP post-trial juror interviews. It tests the hypothesis that jurors’ 
receptivity to mitigating intellectual disability (ID) evidence was 
limited by their difficulties with the adversarial mental proof and 
clinical definitions, as well as distractions from extralegal factors, 
unrelated to the evidence like premature decision-making and 
heuristic shortcuts, pro-death bias, and racial prejudice. The study 
builds on findings in the capital jury literature that jurors 
misunderstand key concepts and instructions. The death sentencing 
process has failed to meet the guided standard of a reasoned and 
individualized moral response required by Furman v Georgia,6 
Gregg v. Georgia,7 and their progeny.  
The capital sentencing process is plagued with 
what appear to be insurmountable problems. These 
include the pro-death dispositions jurors bring with 
them to trial, their inclination to make premature pro- 
death sentencing decisions, their misunderstandings of 
instructions about making the punishment decision, 
and the host of other pro-death inclinations. . . . They 
also include the systematically rooted adversarial 
provocation of prosecutors to disparage and debunk 
mitigation not specifically linked to the crime. . . . 
 
6 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
7 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  
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Having a new jury impaneled and rigorously 
instructed, or perhaps some other selective and trained 
group of citizens or experts serve at the penalty stage 
to make the sentencing decision be “a reasoned moral 
response,” might conceivably enable the capital 
sentencing decision to comport with constitutional 
standards. Without such a radical transformation of the 
death penalty’s administration, though, having the 
punishment decision be a reasoned moral judgment 
appears doomed to failure, given the numerous and 
intractable problems plaguing capital sentencing. . . .8 
The study also examines whether the bright line cut-off rule 
defining intellectual disability by a fixed number, followed in some 
sample states prior to the Supreme Court decision in Hall v. Florida,9 
exacerbated jurors’ understanding of the disability, and encouraged 
jurors’ stereotypes and popular misconceptions about intellectual 
disability. In a Kentucky case in the sample, where the bright line 
cutoff rule of an IQ score of 70 was operative, jurors were confused 
about a range of defendant’s IQ scores and his intellectual declines 
over time. Jurors were quoted as saying:  
There was a lot of testimony on the grounds that his 
IQ was perhaps not above what we consider a -- what, 
a moron?-- I think that is the term they used. . . . I 
think they were contending that he had an IQ of 70 or 
76 or so, had been tested as high as the 80s I recall.10 
This life and death dispute over a few points of IQ 
demonstrates that the bright line cut-off of 70 may represent a 
misleading artificial statistical convention and is part of the “can of 
worms” and poor psychiatric thinking discussed by Mossman.11 Even 
in non-bright line sample States like South Carolina, with no ID 
exemption at the time, jurors misunderstood the range of numerical 
 
8 William J. Bowers et al., The Life or Death Sentencing Decision: It’s at Odds with 
Constitutional Standards; Is it Beyond Human Ability?, in JAMES ACKER ET AL., AMERICA’S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 425, 489-90 (3d ed. 2014). 
9 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). See also Leona D. Jochnowitz, Book Review, 51 No. 4 CRIM. L. 
BULLETIN ART 11 (2015).  
10 CJP KY death case #531, juror #725. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2)(b)(7) 
(LexisNexis 1990). 
11  Mossman, supra note 4, at 256. 
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IQ evidence.12  One concern is that the pre-Hall bright line rule 
played into jurors’ stereotypes and misconceptions about intellectual 
disability. This was discussed by the Supreme Court in Moore v. 
Texas,13 where the Court endorsed clinical rather than popular 
stereotypes for defining ID. This empirical research on capital juror 
receptivity to intellectual disability evidence is important because of 
the need to avoid the risk of execution for intellectually disabled 
persons, admonished by Moore.  
In Moore v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that when 
judges and jurors use lay common-sense stereotypes to define 
intellectual disability, there is a high risk of “under-inclusiveness” 
and the unacceptable risk that persons with mild levels of intellectual 
disability will be executed.14  Only medical professional standards 
can counter lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.15  Yet, this 
research together with other CJP literature conclude that capital 
jurors often reject professional jargon and interpret mental evidence 
in practical ways and distrust experts as hired guns.16  
This is one of the underlying paradoxes in capital juror 
studies, that while the law requires sophisticated definitions, jurors 
interpret psychological evidence in lay terms, and abhor vague, 
contested professional jargon. Yet, scholars and practitioners state 
that mitigating evidence does resonate with jurors through the 
“orchestration” of lay witnesses with experts who evaluated the 
defendant before the crime, and through a humanizing developmental 
life history.17  
This study concludes that juror assessment of intellectual 
disability (ID) is variable because some jurors view ID as a more 
 
12 In SC life case #930, the pro-death exasperated foreman #1319 erroneously estimated 
defendant’s IQ at the upper end of the expert testimony, in the low 80s and not 70s. “He 
came from a background of violence and had an IQ in the low 80s.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20 (C) (b) (10) (Westlaw 1994). 
13 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051-52 (2017). 
14 Id. at 1044.  
15 Id. at 1051-52.  
16 John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing 
and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1041 n.24 
(2008) (citing Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries 
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1123–26 (1997)). 
17 Sundby, supra note 16, at 1123–26; Sean D. O’Brien and Kathleen Wayland, Implicit 
Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative to Counter Prejudicial Psychiatric 
Labels, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 780 n.166 (2015); Deborah Denno, The Myth of the 
Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 493, 527 n.289 (2015).  
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“organic” sympathetic disorder, which they seem to interpret in lay 
terms, than inscrutable contested personality and other mental 
disorders. Yet, capital jurors were also distracted by threshold extra-
legal factors like pro death bias, racial bias and premature decision 
making that chilled dissent among holdout jurors and served as a 
distracting “counterweight” to the proper moral consideration of the 
evidence. Juror misunderstanding regarding mitigating evidence is 
ageless and has stubbornly persisted throughout the history of the  
Capital Jury Project. It arises from shortcomings in human cognition 
and rational decision-making which impede jurors’ moral 
consideration of intellectual disability and psychological evidence.  
In light of these flaws, it may be impossible to avoid the unacceptable 
risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed. This 
study suggests that mildly intellectually disabled persons were indeed 
executed because jurors misunderstood the ID evidence and were 
persuaded by extra-legal racial biases and premature decision 
making. 
II.  CAPITAL JURY RESEARCH 
The struggles of experts to define and diagnose intellectual 
disability and the difficulty of lay jurors in evaluating the expert and 
lay evidence are linked. There is a relationship between what forensic 
psychologists say about the ever-changing complexity and 
unreliability of an intellectual disability psychiatric diagnosis and the 
findings that jurors cannot understand or are unwilling to be receptive 
to testimonial evidence about the disorder.  
Soon after the decision in Atkins v. Virginia,18 exempting 
otherwise death-penalty eligible intellectually disabled persons from 
execution, forensic psychological scholars began calling the ruling a 
“psychiatric can of worms.”19  They said that one of the reasons for 
the ongoing difficulties was the arbitrariness implicit in the definition 
of intellectual disability which adopted a mere statistical convention 
to categorize intellectually disabled individuals in a “discrete 
psychiatric category.”20 The cut-off of 70 represents an artificial 
statistical convention more than a natural boundary between two 
groups of individuals, and it provides no functional explanation of the 
 
18 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
19 CHAFETZ, supra note 5, at 92 (citing Mossman, supra note 4, at 256) (emphasis added). 
20 Mossman, supra note 4, at 256. 
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disability.21 Another complication was that Atkins associated the 
psychiatric diagnosis of intellectual disability with the equivalent of 
moral desert, and that this stigmatized disabled persons as “morally 
inferior.”  Mossman noted that the Atkins decision could lead courts 
to associate the reduced blameworthiness with other psychiatric 
disabilities, which opened up a “psychiatric can of worms.”22 Yet, 
Slobogin has stated that the idea of scientizing the clinical concept of 
psychological culpability in Atkins and Hall might lead positively to 
expanding protections to persons with other mental disabilities like 
the mentally ill under a clinically scientific stare decisis.23 
The three-phase Capital Jury Project research (CJP 1-1991 to 
1995 and CJP 3-2004) involved trials spanning the periods from the 
1990s to the 2000s. The first phase of Capital Jury Project research, 
(CJP I), conducted extensive structured interviews of 1,198 actual 
jurors in 353 capital trials in 14 States in the mid-1990s.24 The CJP I 
data from juror interviews and the data from the coded trial 
transcripts are used in this paper. By phase 3 in 2004, after Atkins, 
CJP researchers concluded that despite reforms in the law and culture 
over the phases of the research, juror decision-making was 
consistently marred by immutable human cognitive tendencies and 
heuristic short-cuts, extra-legal attitudes towards race relations, pro-
death bias and premature decision-making.25 The bifurcated capital 
trial and structures developed to preserve the defendant’s rights 
 
21 CHAFETZ, supra note 5, at 92 (citing Mossman, supra note 4, at 256); Leona D. 
Jochnowitz, Book Review, PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, EXCLUDING INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED 
OFFENDERS FROM EXECUTION. THE CONTINUING JOURNEY TO IMPLEMENT ATKINS (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2014) and MICHAEL CHAFETZ, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL FORENSIC ISSUES (Oxford University Press, 2015), 52 No. 6 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 
ART 10 (2016).  
22 Mossman, supra note 4, at 287 nn.190-91.  
23 Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v Florida and 
the Possibility of a “Scientific Stare Decisis,” 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 425 (2014) 
(“A second category of individuals who could be exempted from the death penalty based on 
clinical constructs might encompass offenders who were actively psychotic at the time of 
their offense. . . . For instance, in the death penalty context, the mental health profession 
might be able to identify other categories of people who should be exempted from 
execution. . . . A Hall-like approach to the issue would require, per the DSM-5, that at                    
the time of the offense the person demonstrated at least two of the following                                 
symptoms: ‘delusions,’ ‘hallucinations,’ ‘disorganized speech,’ or ‘grossly disorganized . . . 
behavior.’”).   
24 Bowers, supra note 8, at 430.  
25 Bowers, supra note 8, at 425.   
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against arbitrariness did not conform to the cognitive realities of juror 
decision-making.  
CJP researchers examined juror receptivity to mitigating 
evidence introduced at the penalty phase of trial, including mental 
illness, intellectual disability and extreme mental and emotional 
distress (EMED), which was a statutory defense found in Model 
Penal Code States in the sample, (e.g., Kentucky, Missouri).26 
Relevant to this study, the researchers found that intellectual 
disability cases were unique because jurors were both confused about 
the various levels of ID and skeptical. “Jurors reconcile their 
confusion by erring on the side of skepticism, with the result being 
disbelief that defendant is mentally retarded.”27  Jurors understood 
the importance of intellectual disability in “stories,” but failed to 
apply the receptivity in practice. For intellectual disability there was 
a 30% reduction of influence in practice as compared to the 
hypothetical responses, the greatest fall from principle to practice and 
twice the reduction from other mental mitigators such as mental 
illness and extreme emotional distress.  The researchers suggested 
that one reason for the discrepancy might be that subtle psychiatric 
definitions and contested institutional histories impeded jurors’ 
ability to concretely apply abstract mitigating factors to the case 
before them. “It was difficult to apply subtle psychiatric distinctions 
concerning mental illness and definitions of mental retardation that 
may impede or inhibit jurors’ application of these factors in their 
cases.”28   
 
26 Leona D. Jochnowitz, Receptivity of Capital Jurors to Mitigating Factors of Mental 
Illness, Intellectual Disability, and Situational Impairments in Death Penalty Decisions: The 
Capital Trial Analyzed as a Mitigating ‘Weight and Counterweight’ to Premature Decisions 
and Pro-Death Bias (Feb. 22, 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University at Albany) (UMI 
Number: 3680787 Dissertation Publishing Proquest 2015), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2568455. [Note: page numbers indicate 
the ordinal actual page numbers of the dissertation, omitting roman numerals from the 
introductory pages from the pagination]. 
27 Marla Sandys et al., Taking Account of the “Diminished Capacities of the Retarded”: 
Are Capital Jurors up to the Task?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 691-93 (2008) (“These data 
suggest that capital jurors are unable to distinguish among various levels of mental 
retardation and that they confuse the task of evaluating evidence of mild mental retardation 
as a mitigator (a penalty phase consideration) with the standard necessary to determine 
sanity (a guilt-phase defense) . . . . [J]urors reconcile their confusion by erring on the side of 
skepticism, with the result being disbelief that defendant is mentally retarded.”) (emphasis 
added).  
28 BOWERS, WILLIAM J. ET AL., WHO SHOULD DIE:  HOW JURORS MAKE THE LIFE OR DEATH 
SENTENCING DECISION, CHAPTER 1: AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING SENTENCING 
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This sets the investigation of mental mitigation and the subset 
of intellectual disability as being virtually unique. Other decision-
making flaws included premature decision making.29 The race of the 
defendant, victim and the jurors affected receptivity to mitigating 
evidence. 30  CJP researchers found that jurors distrusted expert 
psychiatrists, whom they viewed skeptically as hired guns. One way 
to help mitigating evidence resonate with jurors was to combine the 
narratives of lay persons who knew the defendant, experts who had 
evaluated the defendant before the crime, and experts who evaluated 
the defendant for trial using a process of “orchestration” of witnesses. 
Experts who were “retained ‘after the fact’” would “simply parrot[] 
what defendant’s lawyers have retained them to say. . . . [T]he most 
effective expert testimony often comes from someone who had some 
connection with the defendant before the crime.”31 
Jury research shows that decision makers respond 
differentially to the types of mental evidence. Consistent with the 
instant study, jurors were more receptive to so-called “organic” 
disorders like intellectual disability, involuntary epilepsy and brain 
impairments, and less responsive to amorphous personality disorder 
defenses or purely “psychological impairments.”32 Before current 
 
CONSIDERATIONS n.46 and accompanying text (2013), not published, (on file with author) 
(emphasis added). 
 It was difficult to apply subtle psychiatric distinctions concerning 
mental illness and definitions of mental retardation that may impede or 
inhibit jurors’ application of these factors in their cases.  Such 
designations often depend upon complicated institutional records and 
upon complex and difficult to apply testimony of experts.  For such 
reasons mental disabilities may lose some of the influence they are 
presumed to have in principle when it comes to applying them in 
practice.  
Id. (emphasis added).  
29 About half of the CJP jurors said they had decided on what the punishment should be 
during the guilt stage of the trial. William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys, Benjamin D. Steiner, 
Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing, Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial 
Experience, and Premature Decisions-Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (1998). 
30 Psychiatric problems, a history of child abuse, and drug abuse were perceived as less 
mitigating for black defendants. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and 
Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias and the Death Penalty, 24 L. 
& HUM. BEHAV. 337, 355 (2000).  
31 John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing 
and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us about Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2008) 
(citing Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries 
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1123–26 (1997)). 
32 Phoebe Ellsworth et al., The Death Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity. 8 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 81-93 (1984); Phoebe Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, 
9
Jochnowitz: Bright Line Rule & Capital Jurors
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
386 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
notions of biological causality in modern psychological research, 
these researchers suggested that specifically death qualified jurors 
with “crime control” orientations were more receptive to mental 
mitigating evidence that experts testified had an organic cause. The 
death qualified jurors viewed “pure” psychological conditions as an 
excuse or loophole.  Now, with greater knowledge about the organic, 
neurological, chemical, genetic, and hormonal basis of psychological 
abnormalities, jurors may find proof of some defendants’ mental 
illness more credible and disabling. 
III.  THE LAW AS IT APPLIES TO THE CASES IN THIS STUDY 
In 2002, after the initial trials in this study, the Supreme 
Court, in Atkins v. Virginia,  prohibited the execution of intellectually 
disabled capital offenders (then identified as “mentally retarded”),33 
because of a growing national consensus that intellectually disabled 
defendants were “categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.”34  The offenders “have diminished capacities to understand 
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes 
and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control 
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”35  Executing an 
intellectually disabled person served no penological purpose, and 
weakened the integrity of the trial process through wrongful 
executions, false confessions, poor testimony and poor conferral with 
counsel. While Atkins found that there was a consensus against the 
execution of the intellectually disabled, it noted that there was 
“serious disagreement” over who was intellectually disabled.36 It left 
 
in REID HASTIE, INSIDE THE JUROR 42 (Cambridge University Press 1993); Lawrence White, 
Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense 
Strategies Capital Trials, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 113-30 (1987); Lawrence White, The 
Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &  L. 411 (1987). “Our 
intuition was that it is the concept of purely mental illness that troubles those with strong 
crime control orientation, and raises suspicions of malingering or willful refusal to conform 
to the most fundamental norms of society. . . . Whereas people who feel that the insanity 
defense is a ‘loophole’ may be willing to regard a ‘real’ medical problem as an excuse, they 
may feel that they have to draw the line at so-called ‘diseases’ of the imagination. . . . They 
fail to believe that the defendant really has anything wrong with him.” Ellsworth et al., supra 
note 32, at 84, 91. 
33 The Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida adopted the nomenclature intellectual disability 
to describe the “identical phenomenon” of mental retardation. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990. 
34 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.  
35 Id. at 318.  
36 Id. at 317.  
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to the States the job of identifying and defining the protected persons, 
which was the focus of the Court’s adoption of clinical standards in 
Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas. 
Atkins overruled Penry v. Lynaugh,37 (Penry I), a Texas case, 
which held that intellectual disability was just one statutory 
mitigating factor against death sentencing, which jurors must 
consider and give effect to, but not an exemption. The cases in this 
study, from the States, Kentucky, South Carolina and Missouri, were 
first tried when the governing rule on intellectual disability was 
Penry v. Lynaugh, but the juror responses to intellectual disability 
evidence continue to serve as a reference point and baseline for 
modern cases.38 After 1990, Kentucky narrowly exempted defendants 
with ID from execution, which it operationalized with a rigid bright 
line cutoff rule of 70 IQ.39  The rigid rule was meant to judicially 
identify pre-trial which defendants were exempt. A defendant’s right 
to raise mitigating evidence of intellectual disability at trial was 
preserved by statute, even after a pre-trial decision, and this was the 
basis for the evidence in the Kentucky CJP trials in this sample. 40  
Missouri and South Carolina in this sample were not 
exemption states and had no bright line rule. Missouri did not exempt 
“mentally retarded” persons from execution until 2000-2001. South 
Carolina was one of five states that were still executing offenders 
possessing a known IQ less than 70 at the time of Atkins.41 
“Borderline mental retardation” seems to have been used to designate 
 
37 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  
38 Lisa Kan, Boccaccini, McGorty & Noland, Lawson, Presenting Information about 
Mental Retardation in the Courtroom: A Content Analysis of Pre-Atkins Capital Transcripts 
from Texas, 33 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 23 (2009); Valerie Hans, John Blume et al., The 
Death Penalty: Should the Judge or the Jury Decide Who Dies, Cornell Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 15-02 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2513371 (using Delaware data 
jury data from the years 1977-2007). Both of these articles suggest that more research should 
be done using updated data regarding modern cases, and this author agrees. 
39 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.140 (1), 532.130, 532.025 (2)(b)(7) (West 1990).  
40 Kentucky exempted intellectually disabled persons from execution in 1990, defining 
“mental retardation” (ID) as a numerical intelligence quotient (IQ) of seventy (70) or below 
and set up procedures for the pre-trial judicial determination of the exemption (1990 c 488 § 
3, Ky. Legis S.B. 172, eff. 7-13-90). The judicial pre-trial determination denying exemption 
did not preclude the defendant from raising mitigating legal defenses at trial. KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 532.025 (2)(b)(7) (West 1990); Ky. death #531, tried 1/10/1994]; Bowling v. 
Kentucky, 163 S.W. 3d 361 (Ky. 2005). This legal framework was overruled in Hall v. 
Florida, which may retroactively apply.  
41 The intellectually disabled defendant in South Carolina case B/W Life case #930 was 
executed for a second related murder. 
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mitigating conditions in the non-exempt trials, with defendants’ 
developmental history, abuse and school functioning woven in with 
the numerical measurements of IQ.  Several states in the sample also 
designated statutory mitigation for intellectually disabled persons.42 
An EMED defense was adopted as a statutory mitigating circumstance 
in Model Penal Code states in the sample (Kentucky, Missouri),43 and 
this was coordinated with intellectual disability and mental illness 
defenses. As in present day cases, evidentiary issues arose in all the 
sample cases about defining intellectual disability, the co-morbidity 
of personality disorders, and defendant’s ability to perform simple 
tasks or plan the crime. 
IV.  MODERN ID CASES: THE ERRONEOUS EXECUTION STANDARD 
As in the modern ID cases, the cases in this study also raise 
issues regarding the defendant’s ability to plan the crime, defendant’s 
ability to perform simple skilled tasks like playing cards, and co-
morbid symptoms of anti-social personality disorder. Therefore, this 
overview of modern day ID cases is presented not so much for the 
conclusions of law by the courts, but to suggest that death penalty 
jury decision making may not have changed despite reforms in the 
law. The complex facts of the post-Atkins cases, which were first 
tried under the rule of Penry, continue to confuse jurors who continue 
to show enduring patterns of premature and biased decision-making. 
Many of the same evidentiary issues arise in these and in the pre-
Atkins cases.   
The CJP jurors did not deliberate under the guidance of Hall 
and Moore, but the flawed decision-making might not be different 
under the newer guidelines. While courts are changing the law, these 
changes may not affect how jurors respond to the evidence or 
influence the arbitrariness of the decisions. Persons with ID can still 
confuse lay decision makers by exhibiting seemingly normal skills in 
practical chores, driving, shopping.44 Prosecutors often exploit ID 
 
42 BOWERS, supra note 28, at 23 n.43 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (C) (b) (10) 
(Westlaw 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2)(b)(7) (LexisNexis 1990)). 
43 BOWERS, supra note 28, at 23-24 n.44 (citing the Model Penal Code and South Carolina 
law) (“The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.”).  
44 In the South Carolina case SC Life # 930 B/W discussed below, the prosecutor argued 
that the defendant’s card playing and big vocabulary words showed he was not intellectually 
disabled.  
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offenders’ inability to learn from their mistakes, labeling them as 
anti-social and subjecting them to aggressive interrogations. These 
offenders exhibit co-morbidity with psychiatric illnesses, drug and 
alcohol dependence, depression and obsessive disorders. 
 Relevant here, Foglia & Sandys recently stated that capital 
juror misunderstanding of the role of mitigation for CJP 1 (1990s) & 
3 (2000s) was unchanged.45 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that whether you 
are looking at capital jurors who decided cases in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s or cases from the first 
decade of the new millennium, substantial percentages 
are misunderstanding how to handle mitigating 
evidence in ways that make it harder to find mitigation 
than it would be if jurors were following the law.46  
This raises the question of how or whether death penalty 
litigation can be reformed to address many of the deep-seated 
problems jurors have with applying mitigating psychological 
evidence. Some CJP scholars indicate that juror death penalty 
decision-making cannot be repaired by these legal, constitutional 
fixes. These scholars suggest that the death penalty legal process 
regulated by the Supreme Court is “doomed” and should be 
abandoned with the death penalty.47  Yet other capital practitioners 
have suggested rescue techniques that might alleviate juror 
skepticism with expert mitigation witnesses. Sean O’Brien and 
Kathleen Wayland state that the well accepted Supreme Court rule 
and ABA guidelines for using mitigating evidence which includes the 
defendant’s developmental life story is an effective way to counter 
“dehumanizing” and “prejudicial psychiatric labels” and battles of the 
 
45 Wanda D. Foglia & Marla Sandys, The Capital Jury and Sentencing, Neither Guided 
Nor Individualized, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 364, 375 (Robert M. 
Bohm & Gavin Lee, eds., 2018). Foglia and Sandys discussed CJP-3 and CJP-1 jurors’ 
misunderstanding about the standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) and the assumed 
unanimity requirement for their considering and finding mitigating evidence. Id. at 375. 
46 Id.  
47 “The conclusion that jurors and judges do not consider contextual, environmental 
factors in their sentencing decisions suggest that no matter what changes are made to the 
law, it is unlikely that the death penalty can be cured of its arbitrariness.” ROSS 
KLEINSTUBER, HEGEMONIC INDIVIDUALISM AND SUBVERSIVE STORIES IN CAPITAL MITIGATION 
106 (Routledge Publishing, Taylor & Francis eds., 2014); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 
2756 (2015), (Breyer, J. and Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Bowers, supra note 8, at 489-90.  
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experts.48 Deborah Denno concludes that that advocates should not 
shy away from potentially double-edged psychological evidence.49  
Sundby concluded the orchestration of lay and expert witnesses could 
mitigate juror disbelief.50   
Hall v. Florida overturned the “bright line cut off rule” used 
to define intellectual disability in nine States: Florida, Kentucky, 
Virginia, Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, North Carolina, Washington 
and Idaho, which identified ID strictly as a numerical IQ, usually at 
70. Freddie Lee Hall, who was first tried at the time of Penry, was 
described as being “somewhat retarded” with learning difficulties, a 
speech impediment, and he suffered an abusive developmental 
history.51  His IQ was measured at various times on a range from 71, 
73 to 80, like the cases in this study, but the trial court felt the 
commission of the crime was too complex for a “psychotic, mentally-
retarded, brain-damaged, learning-disabled, speech-impaired person 
. . . to formulate a plan whereby a car was stolen and a convenience 
store was robbed.”52 Evidence of Hall’s developmental history of 
abuse and school failure was not permitted to explain the numerical 
measure of IQ.  Yet, Hall’s siblings testified, in lay terms, that there 
was something “very wrong” with him as a child, and he was slow 
with speech and learning. His mother beat and punished him for his 
slowness, and his upbringing exacerbated his adaptive deficits.53 
The Supreme Court in Hall stressed the importance of the 
developing clinical definitions of intellectual disability, stating that 
 
48 Sean D. O’Brien & Kathleen Wayland, Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: 
Using Narrative to Counter Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751 (2015); 
Kathleen Wayland & Sean O’Brien, Deconstructing Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels: A 
Guidelines-Based Approach, 42.1 HOFSTRA L. REV. (2013), forthcoming, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279547##; ABA Guidelines on the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and the 
Supplementary Guidelines on the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty 
Cases. 
49 Deborah Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of 
Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493 (2015). 
50 Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive 
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1123-26 (1997). John Blume et al., 
Presenting Mitigation: Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and 
Heeding What Jurors Tell Us about Mitigation. 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1041 n.24 
(2008). Charles S. Lanier, Ph.D., The role of experts and other witnesses in capital penalty 
hearings: The views of jurors charged with determining “the simple sentence of death” 
(University at Albany, 2004) (750 pages, AAT 3135668 ProQuest). 
51 Hall v. State, 742 So. 2d 225, 230 (Fla. 1999). 
52 Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 713 (Fla. 2012).  
53 Id. at 719 (Perry J., dissenting). 
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an IQ score should take account of the test’s standard error of 
measurement (SEM), indicating a range of scores, rather than a fixed 
number, (IQ 66-76).54  The Court also permitted the presentation of 
information about defendant’s social and cultural adaptive 
functioning, stating that the disability was a “condition [and] not a 
number.”55  The three clinical prongs of the intellectual disability 
evaluation merged clinical science (DSM-5) 56 with law.  Intellectual 
disability57 is defined to include three criteria: 1.) Significantly sub-
average intellectual functioning; 2.) Concurrent deficits in adaptive 
function, which include the inability to learn basic skills and adjust 
behavior to changing circumstances; and 3.) The onset of these 
deficits during the developmental period or “age of onset,” age 
eighteen.58 
In Brumfield v. Cain,59 also first tried under Penry, evidence 
had been presented of defendant’s advanced planning of the crime by 
acquisition of a car and weapons.  The Court, (J. Sotomayor), held 
that neither the defendant’s ability to plan the crime nor the presence 
of co-morbid personality disorders precluded a diagnosis of 
intellectual disability for purposes of the Atkins exemption.60  The 
defendant’s act of planning the crime could provide only some but 
not definitive evidence of his cognitive ability to plan and adaptive 
skills.  Intellectually disabled persons may have “strengths in social 
or physical capabilities, strengths in some adaptive skill areas, or 
strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise 
show an overall limitation,” as in advanced planning of the crime.61 
The fact that the defendant had been diagnosed with “an anti-social 
personality” was “not inconsistent with adaptive impairment deficits 
 
54 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995.  
55 Id. at 2001.  
56 Id. at 1990.  In defining ID, the Court followed clinical science at the time as set forth 
in the American Psychiatric Association “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists and other experts; the manual is often 
referred to by its initials ‘DSM,’ followed by its edition number, e.g., ‘DSM–5.’”  
57 Id. at 1990.  The Supreme Court in Hall adopted the nomenclature intellectual 
disability. “Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term ‘mental retardation.’ 
This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical phenomenon.” Id.  
58 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3); see also DSM-5 (2013); 
U.S.C. 124 Stat. 2643 (2010).  
59 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).  
60 Id. at 2281.  
61 Id.  
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or with intellectual disability more generally.”62 According to the 
DSM IV and AAMR,63 the diagnosis of ID does not include 
exclusion criteria. Defendant’s sociopathic tendencies and personality 
disorders did not rule out a co-morbid ID.  Scholars have suggested 
that some persons with ID may repeat anti-social and criminal 
behavior due to the failure to learn from prior mistakes.64  
In Moore v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 1992 
non-clinical second and third Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
(CCA) Briseno factors, which the CCA had applied in evaluating 
defendant’s adaptive functioning, with regard to the defendant’s 
criminal and non-criminal planning ability.65  The Briseno factors are 
non-clinical measurements, developed judicially in 1992 by the Court 
of Criminal Appeals in Texas (CCA) because it found the standard 
adaptive functioning measures to be too subjective. 66  In 1980, 
twenty-year-old Bobby James Moore shot and killed a grocery store 
clerk, during the course of a robbery. Moore was mildly intellectually 
disabled. Moore’s IQ score of 74 was adjusted for the standard error 
of measurement, to be a range of 69 to 79. At age 13, Moore could 
not identify the days of the week and had difficulty reading and 
writing. He dropped out of school in the ninth grade and was thrown 
out of his home, eating garbage on the streets, where he contracted 
 
62 Id. at 2280.  
63 Id. at 2274.  In defining ID, the Court followed the clinical definitions at that time of the 
American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, 
and Systems of Supports (10th ed. 2002) (AAMR), and American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (rev. 4th ed. 2000) (DSM–IV)). 
64 Weisberg states that the acceptance of psychopathy as a death-penalty prototype is 
misinformed. Antisocial personality disorders and soft affective deficits unfairly magnify a 
defendant’s responsibility and just desert for the death penalty. Weisberg (2011). The 
Unlucky Psychopath as Death Penalty Prototype; Book Review by Leona D. Jochnowitz, 
Criminal Justice Review, December, 2012).  
65 Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046 n.6; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  
Some of the “Briseno factors” the court considered were:  “Did those who knew the person 
best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—
think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that 
determination?” and “[h]as the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his 
conduct impulsive?”  Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9.  
66 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8. Briseno factors include: 1. The ability to formulate plans in 
contrast to claims about defendant’s impulsivity; 2. Defendant’s leadership in contrast with 
claims about his gullibility; 3. Defendant’s rational responses to stimuli, such as evasive 
behavior; 4. Defendant’s coherent responses to questions versus mental wandering; 5. 
Defendant’s ability to lie or deceive in his or her self-interest; 6. Whether the offense 
required forethought and complexity. PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, EXCLUDING INTELLECTUALLY 
DISABLED OFFENDERS FROM EXECUTION. THE CONTINUING JOURNEY TO IMPLEMENT ATKINS 
54 (Carolina Academic Press, 2014). 
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food poisoning. The CCA found the medical standards to be 
“exceedingly subjective,” and relied mostly on evidence provided by 
the testimony by family, friends, teachers, employers, and authorities.  
The CCA concluded that Moore had adaptive strengths which 
included “living on the streets, playing pool and mowing lawns for 
money, committing the crime in a sophisticated way and then fleeing, 
testifying and representing himself at trial, and developing skills in 
prison.”67 The defendant was able to earn money to avert hunger for 
himself and his siblings, and he displayed leadership while in prison 
custody.  
Justice Ginsburg, in an opinion joined by five justices, 
indicated that “underinclusive” and non-clinical definitions of 
intellectual disability raised by the Briseno factors created “an 
unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be 
executed.”68  The Court rejected Briseno’s advancement of lay 
perceptions of intellectual disability by family, friends, and teachers. 
Persons with mild levels of intellectual disability which lay persons 
did not recognize could especially fall prey to “underinclusiveness.”  
Medical clinical standards would counteract lay stereotypes of the 
intellectually disabled, and avert the risk of executing persons with 
mild intellectual disability. The Supreme Court followed the current 
diagnostic standards which had been relied on by the lower State 
habeas court, the 11th edition of the American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) clinical manual 
and the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM–5), published by the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA). 69  “[T]he medical profession has endeavored to 
counter lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.”70  
The Court indicated that instead of lay perceptions of 
defendant’s strengths, the standard guide for intellectual disability is 
 
67 Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047, rev’g Ex Parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2015) (citing Ex Parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 528 (Alcala, J., dissenting)).  
68 Moore, 135 S. Ct. 1051 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990 and Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320, 
regarding the risk “that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call 
for a less severe penalty.”).  
69 Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; Ex Parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2015) (reversing the state habeas court decision).  
70 Id. at 1052. “Mild levels of intellectual disability, although they may fall outside Texas 
citizens’ consensus, nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities. . . . Briseno advanced lay 
perceptions of intellectual disability. . . [b]ut the medical profession has endeavored to 
counter lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.” Id. at 1051-52. 
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a measure of defendant’s “adaptive deficits.”71  Therefore, 
defendant’s ability to plan the crime was just one feature of his 
adaptive functioning. An intellectually disabled person might have 
strengths in one aspect of adaptive skill but show overall 
limitations.72 The Court also rejected the CCA finding that Moore’s 
adaptive deficits might have been caused by child abuse, personality 
and learning disorders, racial harassment, drug abuse, and not solely 
intellectual functioning. These factors were “traumatic experiences” 
and “risk factors” for intellectual disability.73 They were co-morbid 
with and not inconsistent with ID adaptive impairments.  
Since the Moore decision, the principles of 
“underinclusiveness” and “unacceptable risk” have become a key part 
of the intellectual disability exclusion under the Eighth Amendment 
analysis.74 The standard would be to reject any inappropriate practice 
that increased the risk of erroneously executing persons with 
intellectual disabilities.  Tobolowsky interpreted Atkins admonition 
“avoiding the unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual 
disability will be executed,” to go beyond the unreliability of the 
bright line numerical definitions of ID, rejected by Hall and the 
Briseno factors rejected in Moore.75 She suggested that one 
 
71 Id. at 1050. “The medical community focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on 
adaptive deficits. See, e.g., AAIDD–11, at 47 (“significant limitations in conceptual, social, 
or practical adaptive skills [are] not outweighed by the potential strengths in some adaptive 
skills”); DSM–5, at 33, 38 (citing Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) 
(“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have ‘strengths in social or physical capabilities, 
strengths in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which 
they otherwise show an overall limitation.”)).   
72  “There is a very common stereotype and misunderstanding that if somebody has 
strengths, they are not intellectually disabled,” 11/29/16; p. 21, argument transcript of 
Clifford M. Sloan for petitioner.  
73 “Many intellectually disabled people also have other mental or physical impairments, 
for example, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depressive and bipolar disorders, and 
autism,” which co-occur and are higher than in the general population.  Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 
1051 (citing Brief for American Psychological Association, APA, et al. as Amici Curiae 19).  
“The existence of a personality disorder or mental-health issue, in short, is ‘not evidence that 
a person does not also have intellectual disability.’” Id. (citing Brief for AAIDD as Amici 
Curiae 20 and n.25).   
74 Clinton M. Barker, Substantial Guidance without Substantive Guides: Resolving the 
Requirements of Moore v. Texas and Hall v. Florida. 70 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2017) 
(“Relying on neither the ‘objective indicia’ of the states nor on the Court’s own ‘independent 
judgment’ of penological purposes, Moore elevated ‘unacceptable risk’ to a core Eighth 
Amendment principle that could supply an independent reason for striking a state’s practice 
as unconstitutional.”). See also id. at 1033; id. at 1064 n.232. 
75 TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 66, at 196, 241, 253. “Although Hall specifically addressed 
the implementation of the intellectual disability definition, its rationale logically extends to 
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inappropriate action included jurisdictions that refused to recognize 
the “Flynn effect.” That effect involved a general increase in IQ in 
the population over time, and it necessitated that assessment 
instruments reflect a downward adjustment to IQ scores.76 Other 
inappropriate actions which might lead to erroneous executions 
include Georgia’s imposition of beyond the reasonable doubt 
standard of proof on the defendant, and restrictions on habeas 
hearings under AEDPA.77 
This paper focuses on what the juror interviews might tell us 
regarding some of the central contemporary concerns such as IQ 
variability over time, the Flynn effect, and the role of adaptive 
deficits in clinical decision making. Although the Supreme Court has 
rejected the use of lay common-sense stereotypes to define 
intellectual disability as being under-inclusive for mildly disabled 
persons, it is not surprising that capital jury literature concludes that 
lay perceptions of intellectual disability resonate most strongly with 
jurors. The “erroneous execution standard” developed by the Court 
may fail by its own standards. This study concludes that executions 
did in fact occur in cases of the mildly intellectually disabled, in 
violation of the erroneous execution standard. 
High numbers of offenders are affected, and the stakes are 
high, as the imposition of the harshest penalty of death is at issue. In 
the general population, intellectual disability is estimated at 1-2%, 
but from 2-3% of incarcerated offenders are intellectually disabled.78 
When offenders with IQs ranging from 71-74 are added, under the 
 
jurisdictions’ Atkins procedures that might create a similar risk of constitutionally 
‘inappropriate’ executions.” Jochnowitz, supra note 21.  
76 The Flynn effect is an IQ based factor showing that IQ scores increase overtime, 0.3 
points per year. Current standards require that assessment instruments should reflect the 
Flynn effect general increase in IQ over time, according to the AAIDD and APA. This 
adjustment would result in the downward adjustment of IQ scores. Yet some Circuit courts 
have refused to require the application of the Flynn effect. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 
1349 (11th Cir. 2011). “For example, this circuit has recognized that the statistical 
phenomenon known as the Flynn Effect and the Standard Error of Measurement of plus or 
minus 5% can be applied by a test administrator to an individual’s raw IQ test score when 
arriving at a final IQ score.” Id. at 1373 n.15 (citing Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 753, 
757–58 (11th Cir. 2010)).  
77 One commentator discusses the reasonable doubt standard of proof for intellectual 
disability. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, An Empirical Assessment of Georgia’s Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt Standard to Determine Intellectual Disability, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 553 
(2017); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011). 
78 CHAFETZ, supra note 5, at 141 (citing Karen L. Salekin et al., Offenders with 
Intellectual Disability: Characteristics, Prevalence, and Issues in Forensic Assessment, 3 
Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual Disabilities 97-116 (2010)).   
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SEM definition of intellectual disability, the percent rises to 6-9%.79  
The mean IQ scores of death row inmates are estimated to be in the 
average to low range, generally consistent with the general prison 
population with 27% of the death row sample in one state having IQ 
scores below 74.80  Intellectually disabled persons suffer 
disproportionately from the structural failure of basic criminal justice 
rights, including failed Miranda comprehension, dubious competency 
to stand trial, failure to assist counsel and testify at trial, higher levels 
of gullibility to police interrogations, and false confessions.81 This 
structural failure of rights for persons with ID in the system, seen in 
this study, also implicates the high risk of erroneous execution. 
V.  METHODS 
This exploratory study examines the trial transcripts and CJP 
juror interviews in a convenience sample of 38 Capital Jury Project 
(CJP 1) (13 life; 25 death) cases to ascertain whether jurors that were 
presented with mitigating intellectual disability evidence may have 
been confused by issues of trial proof, clinical definitions, and extra-
legal factors.82 This paper tests the hypothesis, familiar to CJP 
research, that jurors’ receptivity to mitigating intellectual disability 
(ID) evidence was limited by their difficulties with the adversarial 
mental clinical definitions, as well as distractions from extra-legal 
 
79 CHAFETZ, supra note 5, at 141.  
80 FRANK R. BAUMGARTER ET AL. DEADLY JUSTICE, A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY 341 (2018); Cunningham & Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, 
Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. LAW. 
191-210 (2000).  
81 CHAFETZ, supra note 5, at 141 (citing Salekin et al., supra note 78, at 98-99). Only 
about a third of the defendants claiming “mental retardation” have succeeded, encountering 
resistance by States. Only small numbers of offenders sentenced to death at the time of 
Atkins have had their death sentences commuted, despite it being retroactive. John H. Blume 
et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in 
Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689 (2009); Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., 
An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. 
REV. 625 (2009); Adam Liptak, Line drawn in one case dissolves another, N.Y. TIMES: 
SIDEBAR (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/us/24bar.html.  
82 The C.J.P. rules do not permit identifying the defendant, due to the requirement to 
protect the confidentiality of jurors’ identities in CJP studies. The cases are not identified, 
nor are the juror interviews which may contain identifiers publicly available. For more 
complete excerpts of the juror interviews in the cases cited in this study, as well as excerpts 
from the trial transcripts, see Jochnowitz, supra note 26. The research in this dissertation was 
approved by scholars with access to the full data. 
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factors, unrelated to the evidence.83 The 38 cases and interviews, 
tried in the mid-1990s, were included in the sample from 7 states 
because these were the only cases for which the Capital Jury Project-I 
had available capital trial transcripts. The study first provides an 
overview of patterns in the data in the 38 cases, using preliminary 
coding and a cross tabulation analysis.  It then specifically focuses on 
the 6 intellectual disability cases from a subset of 12 intensively 
coded cases from Kentucky, Missouri and South Carolina. 
The study poses research questions which go to the heart of 
the effectiveness of the bifurcated capital trial in providing jurors 
with guided discretion to consider the difficult proof and definitions 
required to analyze intellectual disability mitigating evidence. What 
is the extent to which jurors “consider” and “give effect” to evidence 
bearing on a defendant’s mental disabilities, (intellectual disability), 
for sentencing purposes in capital trials? 84 What explains why jurors 
may or may not be receptive to mitigating factors of mental and 
intellectual disability in determining the appropriateness of the death 
penalty? Was capital jurors’ consideration limited by their difficulties 
with the adversarial mental proof and definitions like the bright line 
cut off rule? Were jurors distracted by extra-legal factors; premature 
decision-making, pro-death bias, racial prejudice? 
The study combines two important data sources; real-life 
post-trial juror interviews from the Capital Jury Project I and 
available trial transcripts which might authenticate juror statements. 
The cases were from 7 states, Missouri (19), South Carolina (8), 
Florida (5), Kentucky (3, video transcripts), California (1), North 
Carolina (1), and Texas (1).85  The analysis consisted of two steps. A 
cross tabulation analysis of the 38 cases for the relationship between 
trial evidence and juror closed-ended responses to explore what 
mental defenses were presented at trial and whether jurors 
acknowledged them as sentencing factors. The percentages 
demonstrated patterns in the data for juror receptivity to the different 
types of mental evidence presented at trial (psychoses, personality 
disorders, intellectual disability, learning disorders).86 The second 
 
83 Sandys et al., supra note 27, at 691-93. 
84 Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.  
85 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at n.76 
86 While the sample size was too small in some cells for chi-square significance testing to 
generalize the relationships to the death penalty population, a cross-tabulation and 
percentages demonstrated patterns in the data, regarding what mental defenses were 
presented at trial and whether jurors acknowledged them as sentencing factors. 
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step involved the intensive coding of a subset of 12 cases to examine 
the mental evidence in trial transcripts and the jurors’ open-ended 
interview responses. This subset of 12 qualitative cases from the 
Kentucky, South Carolina and Missouri (6 life/ 6 death) were 
selected based on preliminary criteria of having provided: 1.) The 
strongest evidence of a variety of mental defenses, 2.) A full set of 4 
juror responses, 3.) Enhanced access to jury selection/voir dire 
processes; and 4.) The unique female offender and child murder 
cases. Out of 12 qualitatively coded cases, there are six intellectual 
disability cases, which are analyzed here.87  
The six ID cases discussed in this study include three cases 
where intellectual disability or borderline retardation was the primary 
defense, with various racial mixes, (South Carolina B/W Life case 
#930; Kentucky W/ 2W Death case #531; and Missouri B/B life 
without parole (LWOP) case # 1418 ID). There were 3 other cases 
related to intellectual disability, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and 
organic brain damage (meningitis). Missouri B/B Life case #1402 
and Missouri B/W Death case #1408 were child murder cases which 
were tried before the same judge in the same month and raised related 
issues of ADD and brain damage from meningitis. Kentucky W/5 W 
Death case #517, recorded on video transcript, involved the joint trial 
of two female gay co-defendants where the issue of intellectual 
disability was raised.88  
 
87 The subsample represented a strong assortment of different types of mental factors 
including personality disorders, intellectual disability and drugs, as well as similarly situated 
cases for female defendants and child murders. The cases were coded into five categories: 1.) 
personality disorders, 2.) intellectual disability, 3.) drugs, 4.) female defendants, and 5.) child 
victims. The mental defenses of ID, female defendants, and child victims and others 
overlapped.  
88 1.) South Carolina B/W Life case #930; juror racial composition affected outcome. 
Jurors responded to intellectual disability but rejected mental illness defenses. Offender was 
tried separately with different juries for two killings and executed for the second case despite 
ID.  
2.) Kentucky W/ 2W anomalous Death case #531, Intellectual disability during 
developmental stages and drop in IQ raised red flag to clinician, but jurors were very 
distracted regarding outside evidence.  
3.) Missouri B/B LWOP case # 1418 ID; jury racial composition affected deliberations. 
There was a culpable codefendant.  
4.) Missouri B/B Life case #1402; ADD; brain damage; ID –first of two child murder, sexual 
assault cases, tried in same month, same judge, same jurisdiction; Racial composition of 
jury-Black jurors caused dissent.  
5.) Missouri B/W Death case #1408; ADD; brain damage; ID – second of two child murder, 
sexual assault cases, tried in same month, same judge, same jurisdiction; All white jury plus 
premature decisions.  
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VI.  CROSS-TABULATION FINDINGS 
Consistent with the above literature, in the cross-tabulation 
analysis, juror receptivity to evidence of intellectual disability and 
borderline disability was substantial and favorable, but responses to 
associated learning disabilities were negative.89  When evidence of 
subnormal intelligence (intellectual disability and borderline IQ) was 
presented at trial, a higher percent of jurors (21%) said intellectual 
disability was a factor in their sentencing decision than when 
intelligence evidence was not presented (1%).  However, overall, 
jurors were generally unreceptive to the evidence. In cases where 
intellectual disability was presented, a high percentage of jurors, 
76.3%, answered that it was not a sentencing factor.  Juror receptivity 
for just border-line intellectually disabled defendants was only 
11.8%. Jurors also responded more strongly to evidence of psychoses 
than to evidence of personality disorders.  Jurors associated 
subnormal intelligence with future dangerousness: 86.5% versus 
63%.  
Evidence of ADD/learning disabilities was presented in all 
intellectual disability and many other cases. They were challenged 
vigorously by the prosecution.  The results for ADD and learning 
disabilities were slightly aggravating and made jurors more inclined 
to vote for death.90 Where learning disability was presented, fewer 
(4.2%) jurors stated mental illness was a factor than when not 
presented (9.8%).  But more jurors, 32% versus 11%, thought 
defendant’s status was emotionally disturbed when learning disability 
was presented. Jurors associated evidence of learning disability/ADD 
with dangerousness leading to a decision tilting towards death. The 
strongly contested evidence of learning disability/ADD may have 
 
6.) Kentucky W/5 W Death case #517. Two female gay co-defendants, jointly tried; one 
death/ one life sentence. The initial sample of 38 cases showed that there were 10 of 38 cases 
which raised an intellectual disability issue, 1418-MO (life); 1409-MO (death); 1408-MO 
(death); 1402-MO (life); 930-SC (life); 922-SC (death); 921-SC (death); 904 (death); 531-
KY (death) and 517-KY (death). Six of these cases were in the sample of 12 intensively 
coded cases raised intellectual disability issues, discussed here. 
89 Tables 1-7 with cross tabulation results are available in the Appendices of Jochnowitz, 
supra note 26, at 214.  
90 Originally, it was anticipated that ADD would be treated as a mental illness factor, but 
the transcripts show that the evidence was logically presented in the context of intellectual 
disability defenses. 
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been aggravating because the disabilities were perceived as being 
common and jurors did not believe the evidence was extenuating.91  
VII.  SIX INTENSIVELY CODED INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY CASES 
The qualitative analysis provided information like juror 
interpretation not available in the closed ended survey questions, and 
helped explain the cross- tabulation results.  Analysis revealed that 
jurors disregarded intellectual disability as a sentencing factor 
because they were confused and thrown off course by adversarial 
evidence. Threshold extra-legal factors other than the mental 
evidence distracted jurors from giving effect to and urging the 
consideration of mitigating evidence in the deliberations process. 
Premature decision making plus racial and pro-death bias and parole 
considerations mounted cumulatively as a “counter-weight” to the 
proper weighing of the evidence. These qualitative results help to 
explain why intellectual disability evidence was not more persuasive 
in influencing juror decisions in 76% of cases, in the cross-tabulation 
analysis. Facts in these sample cases raise many of the contentious 
issues regarding the attributes of intellectual disability discussed 
above, in trials from the same era. The decision-makers struggled 
with definitions for intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits, 
evidence of the defendant’s ability to plan the crime, the co-
morbidity of ID and anti-social personality disorders, and defendant’s 
ability to perform simple skilled tasks like driving a car and playing 
cards.  
Jurors were more receptive to intellectual disability and 
“organic” brain impairments, than to purely psychological 
impairments, and temporal dissociative, borderline and personality 
disorders, consistent with research.92 Still, jurors got stuck on the 
contested and difficult definitions of intellectual disability, and 
 
91  ADD is a common disability both inside and out of the Criminal Justice system. In MO 
life #1418 (child human shield case), the prosecution claimed that ADD was common and 
most sufferers were not murderers. “Three percent of the population has ADD. Do they kill 
people?” The expert responded, “80% of juvenile delinquents have learning disabilities 
which inhibit the ability to function socially.”   
92 Ellsworth, et al., supra note 32, at 81-93; Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and 
Verdicts, supra note 32, at 42; White,  Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial, 
supra note 32, at 113-30; White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 
supra note 32, at 411; Leona D. Jochnowitz, Does Mental Health Mitigating Evidence of 
Personality Disorders Make a Difference to Jurors in Capital Sentencing Decisions?, 50 No. 
2 CRIM. L. BULLETIN ART 7 (2014).  
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questioned its effect as mitigating evidence. Jurors argued skeptically 
over a few points of IQ.  Intellectual disability evidence almost 
always caused some disagreement. Jurors debated issues of intent, 
cool reflection and culpability, but they focused mainly on 
upbringing and family issues. Jurors were skeptical of learning 
disabilities and attention deficit disorders (ADD).  ADD was 
perceived as common.  “80% of juvenile delinquents have learning 
disabilities,” but most learning disabled persons do not kill people.93 
Overall, jurors interpreted contested expert testimony in lay terms, 
based on their own experiences. They focused on proxy family and 
child abuse history. They disliked experts and favored family and 
other witnesses. Jurors acted like armchair amateur psychologists. 
“He was described as mildly retarded but from my observations he 
seemed to be very intelligent and manipulative.”94 
A. Comparing Intellectually Disabled Defendant Murder 
Cases; South Carolina Life Case #930 B/W; jurors 
#1318-1321; Kentucky Death Case #531 W/W; jurors 
#723-728; Missouri LWOP Case #1418 B/B, jurors 
#3069-3072 
This section examines jurors’ receptivity to intellectual 
disability mitigating evidence set forth by the experts and lay persons 
under the various legal frameworks. At the time of these 1990s 
intellectual disability cases, jurors were debating issues of intent and 
culpability.  In light of these evolving positive attitudes, this review 
critically examines the anomalous result of KY Death #531, which 
had very strong extra-legal issues. One defendant (SC Life #930) was 
described as “mentally retarded” (IQ 72), and two defendants (KY 
Death #531; MO Life #1418), were described as “border-line 
mentally retarded” (IQ in 70s).  However, the defendants’ IQs were 
similar. All defendants suffered from learning disabilities which were 
interpreted as failures in defendants’ adaptive functioning and 
inability to learn basic skills. Defendants’ childhood deprivation 
caused developmental impairments and vacillating or declining IQ 
scores, and this confounded experts and confused jurors. Since the 
bright line cut-off rule of IQ 70 applied in Kentucky at the time, KY 
Death #531 case adds insight into whether jurors were misled over a 
 
93 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 98.  
94 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 173. 
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few points of fluctuating IQ and the artificial statistical conventions.  
Even in non-bright line sample States like South Carolina, jurors 
overestimated the range of numerical IQ evidence.95 The confusing 
definitions of intellectual disability may have limited CJP jurors’ 
ability to transition from applying hypothetically mitigating factors 
from principle to practice.96  
1.  South Carolina Life Case #930 B/W; jurors 
1318- 1321 (9/21/1987-9/28/1987) 
Initially, the defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced to 
death in a consolidated trial for two consecutive sexually predatory 
murders committed during his escape from a work detail.97 On retrial 
of these cases, separately, defendant received a death sentence for the 
B/BF case and then a life sentence for the B/WF case.98 He was 
executed for the first case, despite having ID.  Reporting the crime, 
while escaping, defendant asked bizarrely for the officer in charge of 
“dead bodies.”99 He told police he wanted to remain “anonymous.”100  
The prosecution argued that, despite his low IQ, defendant had 
significant life skills including the ability to play cards and the use of 
large vocabulary words.101   
CJP Interviews for the life case took place in July 1992, five 
years after the 1987 trial. The CJP panel was diverse and included 
two active prolife black females and two white males, with an 
exasperated white male foreman.102 Jurors raised contentious issues 
about the defendant’s cognitive ability to form capital intent, and 
about the reduced culpability of retardation for the death penalty.103 
The life verdict was a result of a fractious guilt phase deliberations 
and a trade-off at the guilt phase for life in exchange for “guilty, but 
 
95 In SC life case #930, juror #1319 erroneously stated, “He came from a background of 
violence and had an IQ in the low 80s.” Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 81. 
96 BOWERS, supra note 28, at n.43.  
97 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 82-88 
98 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 73.  
99 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 74. 
100 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 76. 
101 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 76. 
102 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 88-93. 
103 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 82-83.  
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not mentally ill.”104 Juror racial diversity enhanced the power of the 
pro-life dissenters. It is important that even pro-life jurors could agree 
on the mitigating nature of retardation, but they strongly rejected the 
contested defense of schizoid or schizotypal personality disorder. 
One of the interviewed black jurors #1321 (BF) was a leading 
pro-life advocate, beginning at the guilt phase. She said that she had 
been a former student teacher of intellectually disabled children and 
she relied on this experience to advocate initially for a guilty but 
mentally ill verdict, a verdict which jurors did not understand. 
Another WM juror #1318 was strongly pro-life, and he reiterated the 
defendant’s diminished competence to understand right from wrong. 
The pro-life jurors mentioned a voting block of 3 holdout jurors for 
life, who argued prematurely at the guilt phase for a bargain of a life 
sentence, as a trade-off for capital guilt.  
#1321 (BF): IV17. “I used to teach and take care of 
mentally retarded children when I was in college 
during the summer. I connected the children and the 
retardation together, and I couldn’t separate this from 
defendant. I figured that it wasn’t his fault. That’s why 
I decided on a life sentence. I was trying to get 
everyone else to see that. Only two other jurors in 
there were willing to listen to me. Everybody else was 
totally against me.”105 
 
Juror WM #1318 openly described the crass premature 
guilt “trade-off” process: IIC15B, IV12:  “We will go 
along with guilt but there won’t be a death sentence. 
It’s like a trade-off. You give us guilty but not 
mentally ill, we’ll give you life.”106 
The guilt phase deal was based principally on dissenting 
jurors thinking it would mean sending a mentally retarded man to 
death.  
1321 (BF): “We felt we didn’t want to put a mentally 
retarded person to death.” #1318 (WM): “The reason 
 
104 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 79. “We will go along with guilt but there won’t be a 
death sentence. It’s like a trade-off. You give us guilty but not mentally ill, we’ll give you 
life.”  
105 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 81.  
106 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 79. 
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it took four days was if they found him guilty, they 
were scared of the punishment. What if this guy was 
really mentally ill and we find him guilty?”107    
Yet jurors rejected the charge of guilty but mentally ill and 
were confused about the legal definition of knowing right and wrong.  
Juror #1320 (BF) stated that two of the holdout jurors originally 
thought defendant was insane.  But they agreed on guilty (and not 
guilty but mentally ill) because they were afraid that defendant would 
eventually be released from a mental institution, a speculative parole- 
like issue.  The exasperated foreman #1319 complained that the 
dissenters prematurely decided the punishment, and misunderstood 
mental competence. He erroneously estimated defendant’s IQ at the 
upper end of the expert testimony, in the low 80s and not 70s. “He 
came from a background of violence and had an IQ in the low 
80s.”108 He accused the dissenting jurors of violating their oaths.   
While jurors seemed certain that mental retardation was a 
significant mitigating factor, they concluded that the contested 
schizoid or schizotypal personality disorder mental illness was not 
credible. They speculated that mental illness was not an incurable 
permanent disability, but that retardation could not be treated (Jurors 
1318 and 1321). Mental illness or “temporary insanity” was a 
scapegoat excuse for murder, unlike retardation, and jurors were not 
qualified to evaluate it. ”Mental illness could be cured while mental 
retardation could not. . . . Mental illness or temporary insanity seems 
like such a scapegoat.”109  There was not enough scientifically 
known about mental retardation to explain the defendant’s full 
limitations in knowing right from wrong.110 To grasp the legal and 
psychological jargon about knowledge of right and wrong and 
schizoid personality disorder, jurors translated defendant’s mental 
illness into lay terms. They emphasized his abuse history.  There was 
“something definitely wrong with the defendant. I didn’t really think 
he was all there.”111 
The most salient aspect of this life decision in a brutal 
Southern, B/W murder case was the premature guilt phase bargaining 
over guilty but not mentally ill led by a leading African American 
 
107 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 80.  
108 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 80. 
109 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 81-82.   
110 Ellsworth et al., supra note 32, at 81-93.   
111 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 82.  
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female juror with personal experience teaching intellectually disabled 
students. The significant factor in convincing the small cadre of two 
other holdouts flowed from that juror’s personal experiences as a 
teacher, and not from the confusing expert testimony on mental and 
intellectual disability. The poignant outcome shows the importance of 
decision-makers’ individual attributes and of differing legal strategies 
(guilty but mentally ill , GBMI). The case is also uniquely important 
because it juxtaposes juror responses to intellectual disability, mental 
illness, abuse, personality and antisocial disorders. Jurors were more 
receptive to intellectual disability as a mitigating factor, but more 
skeptical about whether mental illness was a “permanent incurable 
disability.” Still defendant was arbitrarily executed for the companion 
murder case, despite his ID. 
2.  Kentucky Death Case #531 W/W; Jurors 723-728. 
(1/10/1994-2/2/1994) 
Defendant (white male) was accused of murdering a white 
couple who had been on a date when they inadvertently blocked the 
defendant’s hidden vehicle.112 He had impulsively escaped with his 
girlfriend and friend from the local jail, even though he awaited his 
imminent release to shock probation, expected in about four days.113 
The prosecutor falsely suggested that the victims had been sexually 
assaulted, but the defense argued that the victims had been on a 
lovers’ tryst. Some jurors later remembered this as a possible issue. 
“He raped them.”114  (#723 WF foreman). 
At the penalty phase in this case, the social worker and 
psychologist noted that that defendant’s decline in IQ score from 86 
(verbal 76) at age 7 in 1960, to 73 at age 14, was an “extraordinary 
symptom,” and a red flag.  Defendant’s multiple placements, and 
chaotic family caused impulsive behavior, and a breakdown in 
judgment triggered by stress. 
The drop in IQ was a very unusual occurrence, a red 
flag to a clinician, which showed trauma, disrupted 
development, and stress. It was attributable to moving 
 
112 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 83. 
113 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 83. 
114 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 84.  
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from house to house, abandonment, family violence, 
food deprivation, and neglect.115  
Total penalty phase deliberations were 14 hours over two 
days. After the first eight hours of penalty phase evening 
deliberations on February 2, 1994, the jurors declared they had 
reached a standstill and were having difficulties. The foreperson 723 
(female) attributed the standstill to two holdouts who thought the 
abuse history (a possible proxy for mental disability) mitigated 
against death. In contrast, the guilt deliberations had lasted only 4.5 
hours. 
There were signs of juror misconduct and extra-legal decision 
making which impeded the penalty deliberations. The premature and 
automatic death decision making together with juror errors regarding 
erroneous verdict forms, news-leaks, and parole considerations 
skewed the decision towards a death verdict. After jurors were told at 
selection that defendant had admitted the murder, juror #724 felt 
“anybody guilty should get the electric chair.”116  Juror #728, who 
had denied reading the article about the accidental killing of a police 
office in the cornfield at voir dire, stated under subpoena, that he had 
prematurely decided the case during closing arguments. “My mind 
was already made up and it didn’t affect me.” The defense objected: 
“This jury was divided. People changed their votes.”117 There is 
suggestion that jurors were hiding the improper media influence. 
“Some people that just didn’t know when to shut up.”118 
CJP juror #727 WM, one of two pro-life holdouts, confirmed 
that he felt pressured into the vote on death. He stated that he and 
another male pro-life hold-out sympathized with the mitigating 
evidence about defendant’s upbringing, and wanted to consider the 
defendant’s deprived environment, a possible proxy for intellectual 
disability. The pro-death cohort failed to accept the role of 
environment in human development. Juror #727 identified that he 
was coerced into devaluing the mitigation.  
But to say that you’re not a product of your 
environment is one of the dumbest things I’ve ever 
heard said. . . . [Y]ou can separate identical twins at 
 
115 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 86.  
116 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 91. 
117 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 88.  
118 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 88.  
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birth and raise them completely apart, and they turn 
out the same. . . . Me and this other fellow thought that 
the question of his upbringing, while it may not be 
reason enough to not give him the death penalty, at 
least deserved consideration and discussion.119 
Juror #725 stated that he undermined the bargaining power of 
the pro-life faction. He claimed he had gotten juror #727 to change 
his vote, by cajoling and threatening a mistrial. He had sent a note to 
the judge about the two pro-life holdouts. 120 
Two men focused on defendant’s abuse history and his 
upbringing. Then the rest of us said, there comes a 
time in everybody’s life that you have to take care of 
your own responsibilities. . . . They sent note to judge 
that we had a hung decision because two were not 
going along with the rest of us.121 
There was deep disagreement and confusion over a few points 
of IQ, which were within the current SEM range, beginning at the 
bright line cut-off of 70, followed in Kentucky, and vacillating up to 
80.  CJP juror #725 derisively called the defendant a “moron,” but 
also disputed that defendant’s IQ as 70, 76 or 80. The derogatory 
term “moron” is not mentioned in the trial transcript, and seems to 
have been a lay term used by the juror.  
Juror #725:  IIIA 6 H: “There was  a lot of testimony 
on the grounds that his IQ was perhaps not above what 
we consider a -- what, a moron?-- I think that is the 
term they used. . . . I think they were contending that 
he had an IQ of 70 or 76 or so, had been tested as 
high as the 80s I recall.122 
 
Foreperson # 723: IVB20: “He had a low IQ, but that 
doesn’t make you mentally retarded. . . . I remember it 
 
119 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 92.  
120 Jurors #725 and #723 in KY #531 are also discussed in Ursula Bentele & William J. 
Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires 
Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2001). “There comes a 
time in everybody’s life when you have to take care of your own responsibilities and you 
know right from wrong, and we just thought that he did.” Id. at 1051 (citing, KY #723). 
121 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 92.  
122 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 90.  
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being brought up by his attorney. . . . At some point as 
an adult, you have to take responsibility for your 
actions.”123 
Professional testimony by the social worker was rejected. Pro-
death juror #725 stated that the social worker’s testimony was 
“misleading” because she stated that anyone who moves from home 
to home is going to turn out like the defendant. “Every abused person 
does not commit murder.”124 Juror #724 stated that once he heard at 
voir dire that defendant had admitted the murder, this was evidence 
of capital guilt which required a death verdict. “Anybody guilty 
should get the electric chair.”125  
The failure of jurors to make a reasoned decision about capital 
guilt at the guilt phase cascaded into a series of premature and 
automatic death penalty decisions. Errors at the guilt phase may have 
locked in a premature decision for death at the penalty phase. There 
were extra-legal considerations of the defendant’s eligibility for 
parole at the penalty phase deliberations by the pro-death faction 
(#723; #725).126 The pro-death voters stated that the parole issue was 
what convinced the two pro-life jurors to change their votes, but this 
was ridiculed by pro-life holdout #727. IIID8B: “They didn’t want 
him out on the street. I disagreed with their reasoning: let’s give him 
the death penalty; that’s the only way to be sure that he stays in 
prison.”127 
This dual murder death case, with other medium level 
aggravators, and strong mitigation, stands out because jurors were not 
receptive to evidence of defendant’s intellectual disability. Instead, 
jurors acknowledged defendant’s abusive upbringing, a “red flag” 
surrogate for stunted intellectual development. The contested 
adversarial portrayal of psychological evidence about the range of the 
defendant’s cognitive abilities, undermined the credibility of the 
evidence and made jurors skeptical of the EMED and cognitive 
defenses.  A juror in this bright line state called the defendant a 
“moron,” but felt that defendant’s IQ vacillated in a range of 70-76, 
 
123 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 90.  
124 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 90. “I was pretty firm that what the social worker was 
saying was that she was trying to mislead these people.”   
125 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 91. 
126 William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to 
Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL.  51-86 (2003). 
127 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 94. 
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(within the current SEM range).  This caused juror skepticism about 
defendant’s culpability over a few points of IQ.  Pressure by pro-
death jurors, plus the automatic premature death decision-making, 
undermined the bargaining power of the pro-life faction. This may 
explain why an intellectually disabled man was anomalously 
sentenced to die, contrary to literature that jurors are receptive to 
intellectual disability defenses.128 
3. Missouri LWOP case #1418 B/B; Jurors 3069- 
3072 (4/20/1993-4/30/1993) 
  
Defendant testified at the guilt phase, showing deep 
intellectual limitations in language and understanding.  Defendant’s 
testimony affected jurors’ perceptions of defendant’s culpability, 
much more strongly than the expert witnesses, and this assisted in the 
LWOP verdict. The case involved the B/B murder of a nine-year old 
neighborhood child bystander, on a theory of transferred intent, 
because the intended target used the boy as a human shield during a 
drug shootout.  The “transferred intent” issue created lingering doubt 
about defendant’s level of participation in the case.  CJP jurors 
wondered why the death penalty had been sought at all in the case. In 
CJP research, lingering doubt was the unresolved guilt phase factor 
which carried over to sentencing and surpassed all other mitigating 
factors at the penalty phase.129 Lingering doubt was most persuasive 
with African American jurors.130  
The penalty expert stated defendant was under EMED at the 
time of the killing. She stated that defendant’s ADD had made it hard 
to coolly reflect in periods of high stress and anxiety. “By nature of 
defendant’s learning disability, the hyperactivity, it makes it almost 
impossible for him, particularly in periods of high stress and anxiety, 
 
128 Phoebe Ellsworth et al., The Death Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 81- 93 (1984). 
129 William J Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing, Jurors’ 
Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decisions-Making, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1476 (1998); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of 
Trial Strategy, Remorse and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998). 
130 Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Jurors Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 
171-274. 
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to coolly reflect.”131 The prosecution claimed that ADD was common 
and that most sufferers were not murders. “Three percent of the 
population has ADD. Do they kill people?”132 The expert responded, 
“80% of juvenile delinquents have learning disabilities which inhibit 
the ability to function socially.”133  The judge disparaged ADD. “This 
guy could have designed a bomb to blow up the dealer’s house, and 
she legally can provide a history of him being inattentive.”134 The 
defendant began crying visibly in the courtroom during the 
psychologist’s testimony. Defendant’s simple act of crying affected 
the jurors.  
In deliberations, jurors were influenced by both the lingering 
doubt and transferred intent problem of the capital sentence and the 
intellectual disability issues. They focused on the defendant’s ability 
to form capital intent and his level of participation in the killing in 
relation to the other dealer. Exposure to evidence of defendant’s 
intellectual disability made jurors debate issues of intent and 
culpability.  Jurors were sympathetic to the defendant and they 
described him as the second victim in the case (#3069).135 Although 
defendant was responsible for the murder, jurors felt that it was really 
the fault of the dealer who pulled the child in as a human shield, and 
that he deserved death. Jurors wondered why the prosecutor sought 
the death penalty at all. Defendant’s guilt phase testimony convinced 
jurors that the defendant was intellectually disabled or in lay terms 
something was mentally wrong with him. Yet, expert evidence 
confused them.  
#3071: IIID12B : “Jurors were confused over why this 
was a capital punishment case in the first place; why 
the prosecution even went for the death penalty. The 
prosecutor was unable to prove that defendant had the 
mental ability to know what he was doing.”136 
One female black juror (not interviewed) had led the guilt 
phase deliberations and raised premature pro-life issues regarding 
LWOP punishment. She shared her personal experiences with the 
 
131 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 97. 
132 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 98.  
133 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 98. 
134 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 98. 
135 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 99. 
136 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 103.  
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panel about growing up in the same St. Louis urban neighborhood. 
She stated that the defendant had no choice; drug dealing and 
violence were a part of his life. This dissenter not only believed that 
the defendant did not coolly reflect, but also persisted in raising 
contentious pro-life sentencing issues prematurely at the guilt phase.  
Jurors (#3072) had to convince her that defendant was guilty of 
intended murder, and that the penalty would be decided later. Juror 
#3071 stated that this BF holdout juror finally realized she had won 
her point that there never would be a unanimous decision on death, 
and so she agreed to first degree murder. The case illustrates how 
racially and culturally diverse jurors shared their experiences with 
jurors who did not have these experiences.   
3071 (WF): “And I think she realized that we realized 
that we would never ever get a unanimous decision on 
death. So, I think that’s why she felt . . . that none of 
us would go for death. I think she finally realized that 
she probably had won her point and that’s why she 
agreed on first degree.”137 
 
#3071: WF IIIB3A: “She grew up in an area just like 
this and knew drug dealers, and she was afraid we 
were going to give him the death penalty.”138   
 
#3069: WM IIIB3B: “We all felt a tremendous 
sympathy for him and knew he was acting out the way 
he had learned to act, that this is how he was raised, 
this is how you exist. . . . We had an African-
American jurist on our panel. She was very well 
spoken, saying that this guy’s just done what he knows 
to do.  This really made us all think about that. She 
really brought it to our attention that this guy is a 
victim too. There really was a lot of sympathy on the 
jury for defendant.  [Lucky Guy] Mm-Huh.”139 
 
#3069 WM: IIID: “We felt very strongly that 
defendant was as much a victim as the child. . . . He 
 
137 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 101.  
138 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 101. 
139 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 101. 
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was very confused, mixed up, and very possibly a 
mentally retarded guy who shouldn’t be “murdered”, 
uh, executed.140 
Although jurors felt the defense psychologist was not 
credible, they observed the defendant’s testimony at the guilt phase 
as laypersons. “There was something not right about him.”141 MO 
#3069 WM stated that defendant couldn’t answer questions. He was 
terribly uneducated. He was slow; he had “mental retardation” and 
hyperactivity. His simple act of crying during the psychologist’s 
testimony also struck a chord with jurors. Juror # 3071 stated that 
defendant had “the mental capacity of a child himself . . . and should 
not be held accountable as an adult.”142 
In contrast to jurors’ lay feelings about the defendant’s 
problems, jurors ridiculed the expert psychologist as a paid witness.  
“She got too technical, too long and towards the end none of us, we 
didn’t even want to hear her. We tuned this person out.” (#3072).143 
Yet the case is rare in jurors accepting the penalty expert testimony 
that defendant had Attention Deficit Disorder, a symptom which 
jurors found aggravating in the cross-tabulation analysis. #3070: 
IIIC13:  “Defendant had Attention Deficit Disorder, couldn’t focus 
on things and was really confused. . . . #3071: The psychologist made 
us aware of defendant’s IQ, which was very low and verified his 
learning disabilities.”144 
Early exposure to the IQ issues and defendant’s own guilt 
phase testimony made jurors debate whether the defendant could 
form the cool reflection and the culpability to deserve the death 
penalty. Jurors were skeptical about adversarial expert testimony. 
“We tuned this person out.”145 (#3072).  However, defendant’s own 
testimony showed the jurors that was something wrong with him 
intellectually in lay terms. The racial and cultural diversity of the 
panel influenced the outcome. Jurors seemed more persuaded by the 
personal experiences of the sole black female hold out juror who 
 
140 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 102.  
141 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 97. Defendant’s own awkward words led several jurors 
to conclude that defendant was uneducated. Defendant described being pistol whipped by the 
dealer on the morning of the crime, using street slang. “My friend said he was going to 
squash it with the drug dealer from the morning.”  
142 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 103. 
143 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 102.  
144 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 103. 
145 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 102. 
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prematurely bargained for life than by the expert testimony regarding 
intellectual disability. She stated that drug trade and gang wars were a 
way of life for youth in the neighborhood, and defendant had no 
choice about his life style (#3069).  The importance of lingering 
doubt regarding defendant’s level of participation in the case in 
relation to the other dealer, transferred intent issues, and defendant’s 
mental limitations led jurors to conclude that the case had been 
overcharged.  
In the above three cases, intellectual disability was often 
heavily contested by the prosecution, causing skepticism among 
jurors over a few IQ points. Yet the evidence almost always caused 
some dissent, possibly due to the fact that intellectual disability was 
an early statutory mitigator in the States. Jurors debated issues of 
intent, cool reflection and culpability, and they focused on upbringing 
and family issues. Jurors preferred lay explanations of intellectual 
limitations. Other important elements included the important role of 
racial and cultural diversity. The premature holdouts in both life 
cases were Black females. Jurors focused more attention on the 
cultural awareness of the holdout jurors than on any expert evidence 
of mental retardation. Jurors were more receptive to defendant’s 
diagnosis of “organic” intellectual disability, which they understood 
in lay terms, but they were less receptive to mental illness defenses.  
The anomalous Kentucky death case is compelling because the high 
levels of juror errors like premature and automatic death decision-
making may have skewed the bargaining power of pro-life holdouts. 
Kentucky’s bright line cut off rule of 70, developed initially to 
support a state exemption from the death penalty, actually worked as 
a misleading artificial statistical convention leading jurors to make 
life or death decisions based on a few points of ill measured IQ. Even 
in non-bright line States like South Carolina, juror #1319 erroneously 
estimated defendant’s IQ at the upper end of the expert testimony, in 
the low 80s and not 70s. 
Intellectual Disability Claims in Racially Contested Child  
Murder Cases and Female Cases 
The last set of three cases analyzed here address specific 
issues found in racially contested child murder cases and female 
gender cases distinguished by the sympathetic quality of the victim 
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and the race and gender of the accused. These cases also raise similar 
intellectual disability defenses and problems discussed above.  
B. Comparing Missouri Child Sexual Assault/ Murder     
Cases Life #1402 (jurors: 3004-3007) B/B; Missouri 
Death #1408 (jurors 3028-3031) B/W 
This section examines juror receptivity to mental defenses in 
two similar cases where the murder is aggravated by an extremely 
sympathetic and vulnerable child victim, but the defendant/victim 
racial mix and the urban/rural venire varies. Sometimes the 
punishment for the most brutal crimes as in child murders is 
moderated by other factors, unrelated to the vulnerable, sympathetic 
victim, and related to extra-legal factors such as the race of the 
offender and victim and the racial composition of the jury or urban 
versus rural venire. Two child victim sexual assault/murder cases 
were tried back to back in the same month, July-August, 1995, by the 
same judge, with different life/death sentencing verdicts and race 
issues. At the time, St. Louis was suffering from an outbreak of child 
disappearances. These two cases, one B/B murder of a known victim 
(life), case #1402, and one B/W stranger murder (death), Case #1408, 
presented natural laboratories for comparison regarding issues found 
in the literature like receptivity to ID mitigation, interracial crimes, 
and jury racial composition. Analyzing cases which included the B/W 
child murder case in this sample, MO #1408, but not B/B #1402, 
Bowers et al. concluded that B/W cases with all white male 
dominated juries had “relatively little disagreement,” while mixed 
juries had more dissenters and holdouts.146 Yet the shared attributes 
of time, place, judge and child victim of B/W case #1408 and B/B 
case #1402 have not previously been compared. Although there were 
other differences in these cases besides race, including a hyper-
aggressive prosecution and defendant’s graphic and damaging 
confession to police in #1408, the interracial murder and the racial 
homogeneity of the jurors may have distracted from the receptivity to 
mental mitigation.  
Case 1 #1402 (B/B) was tried in St. Louis County before a 
mixed-race urban jury, with 2 Black males and an Asian male. 
 
146 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: 
A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black 
and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1523 (2004).  
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Because of substantial pre-trial publicity, the jury in Case 2 #1408 
was selected from an all-white venire in rural Springfield, Clayton 
Co., but tried in St. Louis. Only three of the 90-person venire in 
Springfield were black, and the jury selected was all white, following 
peremptory challenges, Batson motions, and death qualification. The 
strategic decision by the defense in case #2 to move the venire out of 
urban St. Louis, combined with the B/W defendant/victim racial mix, 
may have backfired.  
Mental defenses were similar in both cases, with testimony 
from a developmental psychologist in Case #1402 (B/B), and from a 
neuropsychologist and child psychologist in Case #1408 (B/W). Both 
defendants suffered from childhood meningitis, which caused brain 
damage, and from early abuse and neglect. The defendant in #1408 
(death) had more serious mental problems, including borderline 
intellectual disability, than the defendant in #1402 (life) (ADD), but 
jurors were more insensitive to the defense.  Case #1408 (B/W) also 
included emotional disturbances in the courtroom by the victim’s 
mother about defendant’s confession. The defendant told police that 
the child had pulled down her pants and asked for sex. The weeping 
prosecutor at penalty closing repeatedly banged the murder weapon 
bed slat which had crushed the child’s skull. By contrast, the female 
prosecutor in the #1402 (B/B) seemed more deliberately subdued. 
Further, the defendant in the #1402 (B/B) provided a denial defense, 
which raised lingering doubt among holdout Black jurors. Lingering 
doubt was the “guilt phase” factor which surpassed in importance, in 
jurors’ minds, all other mitigating factors at the penalty phase, 
especially among Black jurors.147 
1.  Missouri Life Case 1 #1402 (jurors: 3004-3007) 
(7-17-95 thru 7-24-95) B/B  
The killing of the twelve-year-old girl occurred January 18, 
1994. She lived in the Northern Limits neighborhood of St. Louis 
County, and had been stabbed in her home 25 times. Her oldest sister 
was dating the defendant. The judge, out of the jury’s presence, 
 
147 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in 
Capital Sentencing, Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature 
Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (1998); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and 
Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1557, 1577-78, 1582, 1589 (1998).  
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expressed personal shock over the brutality of the murder.  “Here’s a 
12 year old girl, never in trouble before, an honor student, on the 
choir at church, certainly her life is worth more than that, and a shit 
bum on trial for her murder. . . .”148 
Defendant’s mother testified that she had failed to follow 
doctors’ recommendations to give him Ritalin to control his 
childhood ADD.149 The prosecutor emphasized that the expert 
psychologist was not medically qualified to diagnose the brain 
damage and meningitis. Jurors (3005) vividly remembered the 
expert’s lack of medical qualifications, and also ridiculed how 
childhood meningitis occurring 28 years earlier could have a nexus 
to the crime. 
The CJP panel, interviewed two months after trial in 
September, 1995, had three White females (3004), (3006), (3007-
foreperson) and one pro-death Black male (3005). There was racial 
strife on the panel. The jury included two Black and one Chinese 
male pro-life holdouts, who were not interviewed. Jurors 3004 and 
3006 disparaged the Chinese juror, stating that this engineer had 
extremely impaired language skills and was pro-life. At the guilt 
phase, the jurors were initially split along racial grounds on the 
lingering doubt issue, as defendant denied the killing, and regarding 
defendant’s level of intent. They ultimately found that repeatedly 
stabbing a child 25 times showed deliberation and intent. At the 
penalty phase the same dissenters rejected a capital aggravator 
because the defendant had not committed mass murder.  
3006: IIIB3C “There were a couple of the Black guys 
who never thought he was guilty until the very end. 
They worried, the jury will think we are just saying 
he’s not guilty because we are Black and defendant is 
Black. The Black and White thing….”150  
 
148 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 161. 
149 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 162. 
150 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 163. 3006: IIIB3C: “There were a couple of the Black 
guys who never thought he was guilty until the very end. They worried, the jury will think 
we are just saying he’s not guilty because we are Black and defendant is Black. The Black 
and White thing. . . . We had one woman, I’d be talking about guilt and she’d be shaking her 
head. When the jury was polled she said ‘I don’t think he’s guilty.’ It caused dissension and 
it turned into an argument. 3005: IIIB3A: The biggest point of disagreement at the guilt 
phase was: “The proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Some people thought they had enough 
proof. Others didn’t. How many times he stabbed the victim was a really big issue. I thought 
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While jurors acknowledged the mental evidence presented 
regarding meningitis, brain damage and child abuse, jurors doubted 
whether a childhood sickness had any nexus to the crime 28 years 
later. #3005: “That he had meningitis. It was really weak. 28 years 
later they say this is why he does it.”  Jurors also doubted the veracity 
of the psychologist following cross-examination that she was not an 
MD and could not diagnose brain damage from meningitis 
(#3005/#3007).  
3005: IIIC7: “The psychiatrist. She made statements 
that could really only be done by a doctor, I found that 
kind of jarring. There were some things that really 
only a doctor could answer. She thought she could 
answer those. But the prosecution played that up.” 
IIIB10N: Weakest part? “That he had meningitis. It 
was really weak. 28 years later they say this is why he 
does it.151 
They felt more strongly about defendant’s deprived 
upbringing and dysfunctional family than his mental status. The 
expert testimony was discounted. WF #3004 indicated disparagingly 
in lay terms that there was something “wrong” with defendant. He 
was a “psycho.” 
At the penalty phase the pro-death supporters felt that the pro-
life dissent was due to racially-charged educational limitations. Juror 
3004 WF expressed that the education gap with jurors with only high 
school diplomas had caused the lack of unanimity because they did 
not understand the issues and acted out of “ignorance.”  The final 
division at the penalty phase involved two black male guilt phase 
dissenters and one white female, who the CJP jurors stated would 
have conceded, but was emboldened by the two male jurors. They 
felt aggravation would have to be a mass murder, or a WWII-style 
genocide. 
“There was an educational gap. It’s obvious that they 
are picking a common man for jury duty, and they are 
not picking all college educated people. This was a 
 
it was a really major factor.”  IIIB61A: Less than capital murder: Some people felt there 
wasn’t enough proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 163. 
151 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 164.  
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jury of peers. . . .” (referring to the Black 
defendant).152 
Pro-death jurors 3004 and 3006 used racial descriptors to 
explain the dissension at the guilt phase. The Black holdout jurors at 
the guilt phase were “nutso, and annoying.” (3004). They expressed 
frustration with a pro-life Chinese engineer who had impaired 
English language skills. “He had a very strong accent and chopped up 
his words. He was one of those people who were against the death 
penalty.”153 
The disagreement at the penalty phase had its seeds in the 
dissent among two black jurors in the guilt phase, who raised issues 
of lingering doubt/level of participation/intent, following defendant’s 
denial defense. The dissenters felt that the killing had not been a 
serial murder, and that the repeated stabbings could have been a loss 
of control, a compulsion. The jurors failed to agree unanimously on a 
threshold aggravator, and never balanced the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, like defendant’s childhood deprivation and mental 
factors.  Therefore, the deliberations centered implicitly on racial 
differences, and not on the mental disability mitigation. White                
pro-death jurors doubted the veracity of the psychologist and the 
mitigating effect of childhood meningitis. They accepted that 
defendant’s family was “a miserable lot,” and labeled defendant 
pejoratively a psycho.  Defendant’s denial defense at the guilt phase 
helped form residual doubt in the minds of the racially diverse pro-
life leaning dissenters, who pre-decided the case.  The white pro-
death jurors used racial descriptors and interpreted the dissent as 
ignorance and lack of education, stating that the holdouts had 
violated their juror oaths. Race was the strongest extra-legal factor in 
the verdict, showing arbitrariness.  
2.  Missouri Death Case 2 #1408 (jurors 3028-3031) 
(7/31/95- 8/10/95) B/W  
Defendant was accused of the murder of a ten-year-old fifth 
grade neighborhood girl at his residence on 12-1-1993, by crushing 
her skull with a wooden bed board.  The victim was walking up the 
street to a friend’s house, after returning home from school, and may 
 
152 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 165.  
153 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 165.  
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have been abducted. She carried an alarm to be used if she was in 
trouble, which was later found broken on the street. He hid the 
decomposing body in the basement behind the furnace for a week. 
The defendant confessed to police that after the child entered the 
basement, he tried to rape her, but he was unable to do so.154 
The theatrical trial tactics of the prosecutor may have 
complicated the racial undertones for this interracial child murder 
trial before an all-white jury.  At the penalty closing, the prosecutor 
brought his kids to court, and cried. Weeping, the prosecutor 
repeatedly banged the murder weapon bed slat which had crushed the 
child’s skull.   
“This guy chased this little baby around the basement 
trying to kick her clothes off while he is beating her 
with a stick. He crushed this little baby’s skull–five 
times.”155 
There were emotional disturbances in the courtroom by the 
victim’s mother which jurors vividly recalled. The defendant told 
police that the child had pulled down her pants soliciting sex. After 
hearing this taped confession, the mother began screaming in court 
and had to be removed, an episode recalled by jurors. “You son of a 
bitch. I hope you fry in Hell!” (#3031).156 The jury deliberated only 
1.5 hours in both guilt and penalty phases.  
The prosecutor argued that defendant’s IQ numerical score 
was not intellectually disabled. “Defendant is not mentally retarded is 
he (IQ. 69-71)? Your score was 78. The DSM score for borderline-
retardation is 71-84.”157 Jurors stated, “He was described as mentally 
retarded, but from my observation he seemed quite intelligent and 
manipulative.”158 
Jurors were interviewed in October, 1995, just two months 
after the August, 1995 trial. The jury panel was all white, 6 males and 
6 females, and this homogeneity, Bowers, Sandys and Brewer 
observed, led to low disagreement on sentencing.159 There was only 
 
154 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 168. 
155 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 169.  
156 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 173.  
157 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 169. 
158 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 170.  
159 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: 
A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black 
and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1523 (2004). 
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one WF first vote life dissenter who focused on the reliability of 
defendant’s confession, a lingering doubt issue, and on his childhood 
history of abuse, a mitigation issue. But on the second vote, she 
decided that the abuse was not an “excuse” from punishment for the 
crime. Juror #3028 WF: “She decided whether he had a deprived 
background. We all agreed that he did—but that didn’t excuse him 
from punishment for what he did.”160  Another sympathetic juror 
(CJP #3030) described her consideration of the defendant’s 
upbringing, but this may have been suppressed by the panel’s 
premature decision making plus the racial homogeneity. In a diverse 
environment friendlier to a life verdict, these first vote life holdouts 
may have prevailed.  
Jurors downplayed mitigating mental and child abuse history. 
Jurors felt that the lay teacher defense witness’s testimony backfired, 
and that it depicted the young defendant as manipulative. Race was 
not mentioned. 
3028: IIB1V: “In trial he was described as mildly 
retarded but from my observations he seemed to be 
very intelligent and manipulative.” (3031). IIIC7: 
“School teacher mentioned how manipulating 
defendant had been as a child.” IIIC8A: She was 
supposed to be showing what a deprived childhood he 
came from, but she gave another reason of why 
defendant couldn’t be trusted.”161 
The jurors recalled the damaging cross examination of both 
defense psychologists, describing the defendant pejoratively as 
“crazy.” “A psychologist who in my mind was proven incompetent of 
her assessment. The prosecution just tore that poor lady apart. He had 
her in tears.” IIA 2I: The defense tried to make the client out to be 
‘crazy.’”162 Juror #3028 recalled that defendant wrote on an 
employment application that he had finished the eleventh grade, and 
 
160 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 173. 
161 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 172.  
162 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 172. Juror 3029: IIIC8A : “Yeah-The 
psychologist…Dr’s testimony ‘got torn apart’…” Also the cross examination of expert #2 
backfired; Juror 3030: IIIC8A :  “Psychologist. She was analyzing a story defendant had 
written. It showed that ‘defendant wasn’t all there’. But the prosecution ripped her testimony 
open.”  Juror 3031: IIIC8A :  A psychologist who in my mind was proven incompetent of 
her assessment. The prosecution just tore that poor lady apart. He had her in tears.” IIA 2I: 
The defense tried to make the client out to be “crazy.” Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 172.  
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that he had passed a driver’s test. Only WF #3030 said she felt sorry 
for the defendant (IIB7I). She described the defendant as being 
“mildly retarded” (IIA 4C), and she showed sensitivity to defendant’s 
mental factors and family background (IV17).163 These small doubts 
about defendant’s guilt related to defenses about intent, impulsivity, 
and level of participation, were important given the other jurors’ 
feeling that the guilt issue had been predetermined by defendant’s 
confession.  
The early confession and the frontloading of mitigation had a 
detrimental unintended effect on pro-death jurors, because they pre-
decided the penalty with guilt. Jurors stated chillingly that after the 
admission of guilt, the question of capital guilt was pre-decided, 
before deliberations. #3029 WM: “Because of the admission, the 
defense lawyer could have been one of the jurors . . .we didn’t even 
have to go into the jury room.”164 Juror #3031 WM chillingly stated 
that defendant’s confession meant that he had pled guilty.  He had 
decided the case after hearing the admission in the opening 
statements. Had there been a more diverse jury in this case, and less 
premature automatic death decision making, some of the feelings of 
juror #3030 and the first vote life hold out juror to understand and 
feel sorry for defendant might have been reinforced and they may 
have been stronger pro-life holdouts. The effect was race “plus” these 
errors. 
The short 1.5 hour deliberations proceeded with little dissent. 
Only one first vote life holdout juror and one ambivalent juror (3030) 
focused briefly on defendant’s confession, a lingering doubt issue, 
and on his childhood history of abuse, a mitigation issue. Although 
the jurors conceded that defendant had a deprived childhood, they felt 
that this would not excuse the defendant from punishment.  Jurors 
doubted the intellectual disability diagnosis. Pro-death jurors viewed 
the defendant’s confession in the opening statement as prematurely 
resolving any lingering doubts they had of capital guilt, and ignored 
the defendant’s mental intent. The racial homogeneity plus the 
automatic and premature decision making limited the power of 
ambivalent jurors to voice doubt about mitigation.   
In these similarly situated child murder cases, the punishment 
for the most brutal crimes as in child murders was less related to the 
 
163 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 173. 
164 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 172.  
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vulnerable, sympathetic victim, and more related to extra-legal 
factors such as the races of the offender and victim and the racial 
composition of the jury.  The differing verdicts demonstrate the 
arbitrariness of death penalty sentencing. There were other 
differences in these cases besides race, including a hyper-aggressive 
prosecution and defendant’s graphic and damaging confession to 
police in #1408. The interracial murder and the racial homogeneity of 
the jurors may have also distracted from the receptivity to mental 
mitigation.  
C. Capital Jurors’ Receptivity to Mental Mitigation for 
Female Defendants with Non-Stereotypic Gender 
Behavior (Kentucky Death #517 W/5 W) (jurors: 666-
667), Trial dates: 2/24/1987-3/9/1987.   
In the capital jury literature, female defendants were typically 
treated more sympathetically in death penalty trials, but only if they 
fell within the cultural stereotype of female characteristics, and they 
were treated more harshly if they presented more aggressive non-
stereotypic gendered behavior, such as being, “unemotional and hard-
driving.”165 Analyzing clinical testimony, disorder type, and female 
gender, White found that jurors tended to believe the psychological 
defenses of females over males.166 Jurors are more receptive to 
female defendant’s psychological defenses, possibly because women 
are more credible and sympathetic or they are stereotypically viewed 
as more unstable than men.167  Often judges treat women in a 
paternalistic way, with more lenient sentences, but if they act 
aggressively or non-stereotypically less feminine and less emotional, 
they get much harsher treatment.  Scholars have written that the 
decision to execute female murderers like Karla Faye Tucker in 
Texas raise not only the issue of the unfair gendering of the death 
penalty with respect to women, but also the issue of the unfairness 
 
165 Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine 
Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 437 n.13 (2002) (citing Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: 
Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1350 
(1994). 
166 See Lawrence White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411 (1987).   
167 Id. 
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and senselessness of the death penalty for death row inmates of all 
races, “whether illiterate, ugly, miserable or frightening.”168      
This Kentucky multiple-murder five victim case involved two 
gay female co-defendants, tried jointly. Co-defendants, A and B, 
were charged with capital murder for the killings of five victims (2 
female/3 male),  while on a cocaine binge. Both A and B had been 
free basing and injecting crack cocaine for four days before the 
murders, and were seeking cash for another fix. While both 
defendants were involved to varying degrees in the multiple murders, 
A received a death verdict, and B, who claimed battered partner 
syndrome, received a life verdict. Notwithstanding A’s more severe 
mental problems, jurors were preoccupied with the relative 
culpability between these women, and not their individualized 
histories.  A was resentenced to life, following appeal.169 
One of the defendants, “A,” suffered from intellectual 
disability, but she was embarrassed about the condition, and limited 
that testimony in court. Chafetz has written that malingering in ID 
testing includes the possibility that some intellectually disabled 
persons are embarrassed by the stigma of intellectual disability, and 
may deliberately hide information.170 Jurors perceived A (death), who 
had a more severe mental and abuse history, as aggressive, 
threatening, remorseless and cold, but they perceived “B” (life) to be 
the less culpable battered partner, acting under duress from her 
accomplice. Jurors here were relatively unreceptive to A’s borderline 
personality disorder, sexual abuse and cocaine dependence, and 
emphasized her non-stereotypic aggressiveness, coldness, and lack of 
remorse. “Lots of people grow up under terrible circumstances, but 
they don’t go out and kill people.”171  “A was the more aggressive of 
 
168 Joan W. Howarth, Executing White Masculinities, Learning from Karla Faye Tucker, 
81 OR. L. REV. 183, 229 (2002); Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution 
of Women on the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 581, 599 (2000) (“Karla 
Faye Tucker asked the Governor of Texas and the people of the United States to spare 
everybody on death row because they were human beings like herself and those who heard 
her”); Victor L. Streib, Rare & Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 609, 618 (stating that often the type of crime women typically commit, the types of 
aggravators, and even the type of mitigating evidence might result in the death penalty being 
applied less frequently for women).  
169 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 146. 
170 MICHAEL CHAFETZ, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORENSIC ISSUES 
150 (Oxford University Press 2015).  
171 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 152. 
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the two women.”172 The defense attorney told the judge at voir dire, 
outside of jury presence: “My concern is that there is an undercurrent 
in this community that these girls should burn.” In B’s case, surprise 
jailhouse letters were disclosed showing A’s complicated emotions 
and threats to B. “Remember if you mess with me, even if we are sent 
to different penitentiaries, I will plan your extermination.”173   
There were gender differences among the jurors, with female 
jurors uncharacteristically voting more harshly in response to A’s 
threatening behavior.  Juror #666 claimed she was probably the 
softest, and some of the other women were “harsh.” Juror #667 
(Foreman) stated that the women were more upset than the men. 
Juror #667 (WM foreperson) indicated that jurors focused 
comparatively on whether “both women were equally guilty.” The 
strongest factor was that A was the more “aggressive” of the two 
women.   
One of the important factors in reaching the death sentence 
was A’s threats to kill B in prison, and jurors’ beliefs that she would 
be dangerous and would kill again in prison (#666). Jurors 
acknowledged A’s abuse history, but minimized its importance as an 
excuse rather than mitigation. “Lots of people grow up under terrible 
circumstances, but they don’t go out and kill people the way A 
did.”174  The most important factor was that A showed “no sorrow or 
regret,” and she seemed cold, a factor which distinguished her 
culpability from B. “She showed no remorse.”175 
In this trial, co-defendant A presented with more severe 
mental abnormalities than B, but jurors underplayed the mental 
mitigation as an excuse. Both co-defendants suffered from 
intellectual disability and anti-social disorders, but the issue of ID 
 
172 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 151. 
173 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 150. Venire persons, not selected, were stunned that 
women had been responsible for the brutal crime. “I can’t believe that two women would 
have committed such a brutal crime, here in Lexington. I can’t believe they were women.” 
Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 147. After testimony about the family violence, jurors 
approached the bench and asked the judge where A’s father was and why hadn’t he come to 
court. A’s counsel called B’s jailhouse informants perjurers, and suggested that the jail 
witnesses would benefit with a ‘buffet of leniency” in exchange for their testimony.  “Are 
there any women in the County jail who have not testified in this trial?” Response: “No they 
are all here.” Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 151.  
174 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 152.  
175 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 153. 667: IIIC11A : “She showed no sorrow or regret, 
and that’s what made her so cold. I tell you, people were upset. Everybody was upset. . . . 
She showed no remorse. Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 153. 
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was barely referenced by the professionals and jurors. A refused to 
admit evidence of IQ due to embarrassment, but her own taped 
testimony to her psychiatrist at the penalty phase suggested she was 
hiding her IQ. Jurors compared the relative culpability of the 
defendants, and they focused almost entirely on A’s jailhouse letters 
revealing a complex array of threats, love, and sexual desire.  A was 
perceived as “aggressive,” “cold,” and without remorse, while B was 
perceived as passive, battered, and under the control of her 
accomplice. Jurors acknowledged but minimized the importance of 
A’s history of sexual abuse, stating it was an excuse.  The jurors 
underplayed the fact that B was actively involved in at least four of 
the five murders. It is possible that jurors penalized A in this 1990s’ 
trial for playing a more aggressive role in a gay relationship. The 
non-stereotypic gender behavior encouraged jurors to view A more 
harshly in assessing her comparative culpability with B.176 
Compatible with the hegemonic individualism theory, jurors failed to 
contextualize life history and engaged in “individualistic guilt 
centered question of culpability.”177  
VIII.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study supports the cases discussed above that when 
jurors apply lay common-sense stereotypes to define intellectual 
disability, there is a high risk of “underinclusiveness” and 
unacceptable risk that persons with mild levels of intellectual 
disability will be executed. Although in Moore v Texas, the Supreme 
Court held that only the medical professional standards could counter 
lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled, the capital jury research 
demonstrates that jurors respond more strongly to lay testimony and 
evidence of intellectual disability than to psychological evidence. The 
anomaly in capital juror studies is that while the law requires 
technical explanations, jurors interpret the evidence in practical 
terms.  MO. LWOP #1418; juror #3069 WM: “There was something 
not right about him.”178 “The defendant couldn’t answer questions. 
 
176 Streib, supra note 168, at 618. 
177 Ross Kleinstuber, “We’re All Born with Equal Opportunities”: Hegemonic 
Individualism and Contextual Mitigation Among Delaware Capital Jurors, 1 J. QUALITATIVE 
CRIM. JUST. & CRIMINOLOGY 152 (2013). 
178 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 100. 
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He was terribly uneducated. He was slow; he had ‘mental retardation’ 
and hyperactivity.”179 
 From this it is possible to infer that legal standards and 
medical definitions will not succeed in avoiding the unacceptable risk 
that persons with intellectual disability will be executed. These cases 
show that juror sentencing is marred by structural problems related to 
premature decision making, pro-death bias, extra-legal racial 
considerations and by skepticism about the adversarial evidence.  
Jury reforms would seem to contradict what is reported here—juror 
heuristic cognitive tendencies like “simplification, dissonance 
reduction . . . and strain towards consistency.”180 Flaws “include the 
systematically rooted adversarial provocation of prosecutors to 
disparage and debunk mitigation not specifically linked to the 
crime.”181 Decision makers fail to consider evidence related to the 
defendants’ upbringing, culpability, social experience.182  Palliative 
measures like orchestration (Sundby 1997) designed to transcend the 
battle of the experts (Obrien and Wayland 2015) or double-edged 
mitigation (Denno 2015) are frail in the face of structural flaws.183 
The CJP I jurors did not deliberate under the guidance of the 
Hall and Moore reforms, but the flawed decision-making might not 
vary under the newer guidelines. Changes in the law may not affect 
how jurors respond to the evidence or influence the arbitrariness of 
the decisions. Persons with ID may still confuse lay decision makers 
by exhibiting seemingly normal skills in practical chores, driving, 
shopping, (SC Life #930 B/W). Prosecutors will continue to exploit 
ID offenders’ inability to learn from their mistakes, labeling them as 
anti-social and subjecting them to aggressive interrogations. 
Offenders with ID will continue to exhibit confusing comorbidity 
with events of childhood abuse, learning disorders, drug and alcohol 
 
179 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 102. 
180 William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design and Preview of Early 
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).  
181 William J. Bowers et al., The Life or Death Sentencing Decision: It’s at Odds with 
Constitutional Standards; Is it Beyond Human Ability?, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE 
PENAL SANCTION 430, 490 (Carolina Academic Press, James Acker et al., eds., 3d ed. 2014).  
182 Ross Kleinstuber, HEGEMONIC INDIVIDUALISM AND SUBVERSIVE STORIES IN CAPITAL 
MITIGATION 106 (2014). 
183 Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries 
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1123-26 (1997); O’Brien 
&Wayland, supra note 48; Denno, supra note 49.  
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dependence, and personality disorders, confusing to jurors and 
exploited by prosecutors.  
In the study, individual juror receptivity to the psychological 
evidence played a backseat role to the dynamics of the group 
deliberations. The unanimity rule was a catalyst for compromise, and 
an emboldening agent for dissenting holdouts.  Diversity on a twelve-
member jury panel allowed jurors from a cross section of the 
community to invoke their experience in arriving at a verdict. 
Conversely, juries which lacked diversity diminished the power of 
any dissent to consider mental mitigating evidence, Mo. B/W #1408. 
Premature decision making chilled the power of holdout dissenters to 
urge the consideration of mitigation.  
The “erroneous execution standard” can add insight when 
analyzing these failures. This study concludes that executions did in 
fact occur in cases of the mildly intellectually disabled, in violation of 
the erroneous execution standard. Jurors were skeptical of the ID 
evidence and pre-decided the sentence before even hearing the 
evidence based on biases. 
The erroneous execution standard applies to the Kentucky 
cases in this sample which followed the failed bright line cut-off rule, 
rejected in Hall v Florida.  The life and death dispute over a few 
points of IQ in KY Death case #531 demonstrates that Kentucky’s 
bright line cut-off of 70 unconstitutionally represented a misleading 
artificial statistical convention and part of the can of worms and poor 
psychiatric thinking discussed by Mossman.184 Jurors were confused 
by defendant’s IQ range of 70-80, although current definitions might 
permit an SEM range of 65-75.  Juror #725 derisively called the 
defendant a “moron.” “They were contending that he had an IQ of 70 
or 76 or so, had been tested as high as the 80s I recall.” Jurors 
neither considered or gave effect to evidence of defendant’s 
intellectual disability, but acknowledged defendant’s abusive 
upbringing, a proxy for stunted intellectual development. The 
contested adversarial portrayal of psychological evidence made jurors 
skeptical of the mental defenses. The extra-legal factors of premature 
decision making, pro-death bias, and parole considerations skewed 
the bargaining power of the pro-life faction towards an anomalous 
death verdict.  
 
184  Mossman, supra note 4, at 256. 
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The “erroneous execution standard” can add insight in a case 
like South Carolina B/W Life ID #930 and its companion murder 
case where the same defendant was executed despite his intellectual 
disability. The outcome of the life case was more related to the 
personal special education teaching experiences of a Black female 
holdout juror than to the confusing mental defenses. Jurors distrusted 
the contested expert testimony and relied on their own personal 
instincts. The life verdict resulted from premature guilt phase 
bargaining by a lead BF juror and two other holdouts. While jurors 
considered intellectual disability as a mitigating factor, they were 
doubtful about whether mental illness was a permanent incurable 
disability. Jurors stated they were not qualified to practically apply 
the psychiatric distinctions and definitions. Juror #1319 estimated 
defendant’s IQ at the upper end of the range, in the low 80s and not 
70s. 
The “erroneous execution standard” adds insight in Missouri 
LWOP case #1418 B/B. Although jurors debated whether the 
defendant could form the cool reflection and culpability, they seemed 
more persuaded by the personal experiences of the sole black female 
hold out juror who prematurely bargained for life than by the expert 
testimony regarding intellectual disability. The holdout convinced 
jurors that drug trade and gang wars were a way of life and not a 
choice for youth in the neighborhood. Jurors were skeptical about 
adversarial expert testimony, but defendant’s own testimony showed 
there was something wrong with him intellectually.  
The “erroneous execution standard” is also shown in the 
opposite verdicts in similar child murder cases Missouri B/B Life 
case #1402 and Missouri B/W Death case #1408, tried in the same 
month before the same Judge, with the primary difference being race 
of the defendant and victim and racial composition of the jury. 
Mental, cognitive, meningitis and neglect defenses were similar in 
both cases.  The punishment for the most brutal crimes of child 
murders was less related to the vulnerable, sympathetic victim, and 
more related to extra-legal factors. The life verdict in #1402 resulted 
from factors not directly related to the consideration of and giving 
effect to mitigation, but to dissent among Black jurors. Jurors 
dismissed mitigation evidence of childhood brain damage stating it 
was unrelated to the adult crime. “That he had meningitis. It was 
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really weak. 28 years later they say this is why he does it.”185  The 
defendant in #1408 (death) had more serious ID and mental 
problems, but jurors there felt that mitigation was not an excuse for 
the child murder. “He was described as mildly retarded but from my 
observations he seemed to be very intelligent and manipulative.” 
Racial homogeneity and premature death decision making 
discouraged dissent and impaired the power of two ambivalent jurors 
to voice their doubts.  There were other differences in these cases 
besides race, including a hyper-aggressive prosecution and 
defendant’s graphic and damaging confession to police in #1408, but 
the interracial murder and the racial homogeneity of the jurors in case 
#1408 distracted from the jurors’ receptivity to mental mitigation. 
The “erroneous execution standard” is shown in the dissimilar 
outcomes of the jointly tried female gay defendants in case Kentucky 
W/5 W Death case #517, where gender stereotyping was operative. 
Jurors failed to give effect to the defendant’s mitigating mental 
history of borderline personality disorder, caused by sexual abuse and 
cocaine dependence. The issue of intellectual disability was 
abandoned by the defendants, professionals, and jurors due to 
embarrassment, but defendant's own testimony suggested she was 
hiding her IQ. The jurors acknowledged and minimized A’s abuse 
history as an excuse. “Lots of people grow up under terrible 
circumstances, but they don’t go out and kill people.”186  The jurors 
failed to contextualize life history and engaged in “individualistic 
guilt centered questions of culpability.”187 Jurors perceived A as 
aggressive, threatening and cold, and B to be the relatively less 
culpable battered partner.188 
This research begins with the difficulties and 
misunderstandings jurors and experts have in defining intellectual 
disability, over decades. It includes juror structural thinking 
difficulties such as racial bias, pro-death dispositions and premature 
sentencing decisions. It discusses adversarial provocation of 
prosecutors to disparage and debunk mitigation. Mildly intellectually 
disabled persons were indeed executed in this study because jurors 
misunderstood the ID evidence and were persuaded by extralegal 
racial biases and premature decision making. Even cases with life 
 
185 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 164. 
186 Jochnowitz, supra note 26, at 152. 
187 Kleinstuber, supra note 177, at 176. 
188 Streib, supra note 168, at 618. 
53
Jochnowitz: Bright Line Rule & Capital Jurors
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
430 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
verdicts showed evidence of juror confusion and distraction. The 
study concludes with a reexamination of options which include 
highly flawed “reforms” or the demise of the death penalty, under the 
“erroneous execution standard” in failed intellectual disability cases.  
Foglia & Sandys (2018) recently confirmed that juror 
misunderstanding regarding the role of mitigating evidence is ageless 
and has stubbornly persisted throughout the history of the Capital 
Jury project from the 1980s through the 2000s.189  Court reforms to 
ensure that capital jurors engage in individualized, reasoned, moral 
decision-making have resulted in insignificant changes.  This lack of 
improvement points to deep human flaws in juror decision-making 
impeding the appreciation and consideration of psychological and 
intellectual disability evidence. It may be impossible to avoid the 




189 Foglia & Sandys, supra note 45.  
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